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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY
SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH THE AMIR OF KUWAIT

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD A WARM IF NOT VERY SUBSTANTIAL MEETING ON 4 SEPTEMBER WITH THE AMIR OF KUWAIT, WHO EXPRESSED HIS GRATITUDE FOR THE PRINCIPLED POSITION TAKEN BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE.
2. THE AMIR VILIFIED SADDAM HUSSEIN ALONG PREDICTABLE LINES. SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD NEVER ACCEPT THAT HE SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT AND ALLOW THE RESTORATION OF THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT. HE WOULD HAVE TO BE FORCED TO DO SO. IN KUWAIT, IRAQI TROOPS HAD PILLAGED THE COUNTRY. ARMED RESISTANCE IN KUWAIT WAS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT. THERE WAS NOWHERE TO HIDE, AND KUWAITI CIVILIANS WHO HAD NO EXPERIENCE OF FIGHTING WERE FACING A WELL-EQUIPPED ARMY. NEVERTHELESS, THERE WAS ENOUGH RESISTANCE TO SHOW TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD THE FALLACY OF SADDAM HUSSEIN'S CONTENTION THAT HE HAD INTERVENED IN KUWAIT AT THE BEHEST OF KUWAITIS. SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD FAILED ENTIRELY AND HAD INCORPORATED KUWAIT INTO IRAQ IN ORDER TO COVER HIS FAILURE TO SET UP A PLAUSIBLE NEW GOVERNMENT.
3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE EXPLAINED THAT MR WESTON WAS STILL RESISTING SIEGE IN OUR EMBASSY IN KUWAIT. THE AMIR EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT IT WAS MOST IMPORTANT THAT AS MANY KUWAITIS AS POSSIBLE TALKED TO THE MEDIA ABOUT IRAQI BEHAVIOUR IN KUWAIT AND THE RESISTANCE. THE OUTSIDE WORLD SHOULD SEE CLEAR SIGNS OF RESISTANCE BY KUWAITIS AGAINST IRAQI FORCES. THE AMIR AGREED AND SAID THAT IN THE LAST FEW DAYS THE KUWAITI GOVERNMENT HAD BEGUN TO GATHER EVIDENCE OF WHAT THE IRAQIS WERE DOING IN KUWAIT.
4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE DESCRIBED HIS TALKS WITH THE PRESIDENT OF YEMEN. SALEH HAD CLAIMED THAT YEMEN WAS NOT HELPING IRAQ MILITARILY OR BY BREACHING SANCTIONS. BUT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD KEEP UP THE PRESSURE ON YEMEN. THE AMIR SAID THAT THE SOUTHERN YEMENIS AND MANY OF THE NORTHERN TRIBES DISAGREED

WITH THE POSITION PRESIDENT SALEH HAD TAKEN. PETROL IN SANA'A WAS NOW RATIONED. THE YEMENI INDUSTRY MINISTER HAD BEEN DESPATCHED TO THE UAE TO SEEK ASSISTANCE, BUT SHAIKH ZAYED HAD CONFIRMED THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE FORTHCOMING. THE AMIR BELIEVED THAT THERE HAD BEEN A CHANGE OF TONE IN THE YEMENI MEDIA IN THE LAST FEW DAYS, AND HE HOPED THAT THEY WOULD MEND THEIR WAYS.

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE WOULD BE VISITING JORDAN THE NEXT DAY. HE WANTED TO TRY TO BRING A SENSE OF REALITY TO THE JORDANIANS AND TO MAKE CLEAR THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD LOSE. IF THE JORDANIANS DETACHED THEMSELVES FROM IRAQ THEN OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES WOULD HELP THEM. THE AMIR FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND KING HUSSEIN'S POSITION. KUWAIT HAD PUMPED HUGE SUMS OF MONEY INTO JORDAN'S ECONOMY. THE KUWAITI PEOPLE WERE UNITED IN THEIR RESOLVE NOT TO HELP JORDAN AND THE AMIR WOULD FIND IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT NOT TO COMPLY WITH THE WISHES OF HIS PEOPLE. WHEN PRESSED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO CONSIDER HELPING JORDAN IF KING HUSSEIN RETURNED TO THE FOLD, THE AMIR, WITH SOME SIGNS OF RELUCTANCE, AGREED THAT KUWAIT MIGHT, UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, BE WILLING TO RECONSIDER. IT APPEARED THAT THE KUWAITIS HAD NO CONTACTS OF SUBSTANCE WITH THE JORDANIANS.

6. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ALSO RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF ASSISTANCE FOR TURKEY AND EGYPT. THE AMIR SAID THAT THE KUWAITIS APPRECIATED THAT THOSE COUNTRIES HAD BEEN VERY HELPFUL AND WOULD PARTICIPATE WITH OTHERS IN HELPING THEM.

7. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE PLANNING MINISTER, THE SECRETARY OF STATE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF INFLUENCING THE SOVIET UNION. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT HE PLANNED A VISIT BUT HAD BEEN PUT OFF BY THE RUSSIANS ON THE BASIS THAT THEY WANTED TO GIVE HIM PROPER TREATMENT AND DID NOT WANT HIS VISIT TO COINCIDE WITH THAT OF OTHER FOREIGN MINISTERS. SHEVARDNADZE WAS ALSO TRAVELLING A LOT. THE FOREIGN MINISTER THOUGHT HE MIGHT NOW HAVE A DATE FOR THE END OF NEXT WEEK. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE WOULD KEEP IN TOUCH AND THAT, IF NECESSARY, HE WOULD RAISE THE MATTER WITH SHEVARDNADZE WHEN HE ARRIVED IN MOSCOW ON 11 SEPTEMBER.

8. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID WE WERE ANXIOUS TO GIVE THE KUWAITIS ANY HELP WE COULD ON MEDIA HANDLING. HE WOULD TALK TO THE BBC ABOUT THE ARABIC SERVICE IN AN EFFORT TO GET THEM TO USE HELPFUL MATERIAL. THE MORE KUWAITIS THAT COULD COME FORWARD WITH

EYE-WITNESS ACCOUNTS, THE BETTER. THE PLANNING MINISTER (MUTAWA) AGREED. THE FINANCE MINISTER WAS ALREADY IN LONDON TO BRIEF PEOPLE PRIOR TO NEXT WEEK'S RECALL OF PARLIAMENT. THE KUWAITIS WERE ALSO ORGANISING MULTI-TIER CONTACTS WITH DIFFERENT NEWSPAPERS, IE TARGETTED DIFFERENTLY THE SERIOUS NEWSPAPERS AND THE TABLOIDS.

9. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID HE HOPED THE KUWAITIS COULD SURFACE PEOPLE WHO HAD BEEN CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT BUT WHO WERE NOW OFFERING FIRM SUPPORT FOR THE RETURN OF THE AL-SABAH. MUTAWA SAID THAT THE FORMER SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE HAD BEEN IN TAIF. HE WAS SUPPORTIVE.

10. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SUGGESTED THAT THE KUWAITIS TAKE LEGAL ACTION TO ENSURE THAT ANY OF THEIR SHIPS AND GOODS IN WAREHOUSES WERE NOT ALLOWED TO BE EXPLOITED BY THE IRAQIS. THE PERCEPTION OF LEGAL ACTION COULD BE VERY IMPORTANT IN COUNTRIES LIKE INDIA AND BRAZIL WHO WERE A BIT WOBBLY. MUTAWA SAID THAT THE KIO OFFICE HAD BEEN ASKED TO DRAFT A LAW STIPULATING THAT ALL THESE ASSETS WERE THE PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT.

11. MUTAWA SAID THAT HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO SEE MR KAUFMAN DURING HIS VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA. THE KUWAITIS ALSO SAID THEY WOULD SEND A MINISTER TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT FOR THE SET DEBATE ON KUWAIT ON 12 SEPTEMBER.

12. COMMENT. ALTHOUGH THE AMIR SAID SOME ROBUST THINGS, HE SEEMED A SOMEWHAT FORELORN FIGURE AND THERE WAS NO SIGN OF REAL LEADERSHIP (THOUGH THE ABSENCE OF THE CROWN PRINCE COULD HAVE BEEN PARTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS). THE MINISTER WHO IS MOST ON THE BALL AND FULL OF GOOD IDEAS, IS THE PLANNING MINISTER, MUTAWA. BLACKLEY IS LIAISING CLOSELY WITH HIM.

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