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FM WASHINGTON  
TO DESKBY 170900Z FCO  
TELNO 2805  
OF 162350Z NOVEMBER 90

**ADVANCE COPY**

INFO DESKBY 170500Z JEDDA  
INFO IMMEDIATE RIYADH, DOHA, BAHRAIN, ABU DHABI, DUBAI  
INFO IMMEDIATE MUSCAT, CAIRO, UKMIS NEW YORK, BIS NEW YORK, ACTOR  
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INFO ROUTINE ADDIS ABABA, KINSHASA, OTTAWA, BOGOTA, KUALA LUMPUR

YOUR TELNO 1984: IRAQ/KUWAIT: SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE ON RAPE OF KUWAIT  
SUMMARY

1. AMERICANS AGREE WITH OUR IDEAS. THEY HAVE ALREADY APPROACHED KUWAITIS AND WILL DO SO AGAIN URGENTLY. THEIR AMBASSADOR TO KUWAIT DUE THERE ON 18 NOVEMBER. READY FOR FURTHER APPROACH WITH US. AMERICANS THINK MATERIAL IS AVAILABLE FOR A CONVINCING PRESENTATION BUT ARE CONCERNED THAT KUWAITIS MAY NOT BE ABLE TO GET ACT TOGETHER IN TIME.

## DETAIL

2. WE DISCUSSED TUR AT A MEETING IN STATE DEPARTMENT TODAY (16 NOVEMBER). GNEHM (US AMBASSADOR DESIGNATE TO KUWAIT), WOLF (IO, STATE) AND RUGH (DIRECTOR, NEAR EAST BUREAU, USIA) WERE PRESENT. WE HAD GIVEN STATE IN ADVANCE DETAILS OF YOUR THINKING SO THAT THEY COULD GET THEIR IDEAS TOGETHER.

3. GNEHM SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD ALREADY DISCUSSED WITH THE KUWAITIS THE MOUNTING OF A SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE. KIMMITT SPOKE ON 14 NOVEMBER TO THE KUWAITI AMBASSADOR HERE, WHO WELCOMED THE IDEA AND SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD GNEHM THAT THE KUWAITI AMBASSADOR TO THE UN, MOHAMMED ABDUL HASSAN, HAD BEEN TASKED WITH CO-ORDINATING IT.

4. GNEHM SAID HE WAS WORRIED THAT THE KUWAITIS DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE DEPTH OF PLANNING REQUIRED TO PUT TOGETHER A GOOD PRESENTATION, AND WONDERED WHETHER THEY COULD GET ORGANISED IN ONLY A WEEK. AT LEAST, WITH THE HELP OF HILL AND KNOWLTON (A WASHINGTON-BASED PR FIRM) THE KUWAITIS HAD PUT TOGETHER A PRESENTATION ON THE DESPOILATION OF KUWAIT FOR THE HOUSE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE ON 2 NOVEMBER (AND WERE WORKING ON ANOTHER ONE FOR EARLY DECEMBER). ALSO, DURING SECRETARY BAKER'S RECENT VISIT TO TAIF, THE KUWAITIS HAD FIELDED EYE-WITNESSES WHO GAVE

GRAPHIC AND MOVING ACCOUNTS OF IRAQI ATROCITIES. SO THE KUWAITIS WOULD HAVE SOMETHING TO BUILD ON.

5. STATE GENERALLY SUPPORTED THE ELEMENTS IN PARAS 4 AND 5 OF TUR. THEY SAW THE MOST URGENT TASK AS PERSUADING THE KUWAITIS TO ENGAGE A SINGLE PR FIRM. THEY SAID THAT THE KUWAITIS WERE PRESENTLY USING THREE FIRMS: IT WAS IMPORTANT TO HAVE A SINGLE FOCUS IN PREPARING THE SECURITY COUNCIL PRESENTATION. IN THE SAME CONTEXT, IT WOULD BE BETTER TO RIDE THE KUWAITIS OFF HAVING THEIR UN AMBASSADOR AS THEIR FOCUS FOR CO-ORDINATION. ALL WORK WOULD BEST BE FOCUSED IN WASHINGTON. STATE THEREFORE FAVOURED ENCOURAGING THE KUWAITIS TO USE THE WASHINGTON FIRM, PARTLY BECAUSE OF THEIR EXPERIENCE, AND PARTLY BECAUSE USIA COULD THEN BE INSTRUCTED BY STATE TO SUPPORT (AND MONITOR) HILL AND KNOWLTON'S EFFORTS. (STATE REMARKED THAT THEIR MISSION IN NEW YORK HAD JUST BEEN APPROACHED BY OURS ON TUR: AGAIN IT WOULD BE BETTER TO HAVE A SINGLE CHANNEL BETWEEN US TO AVOID CONFUSION.)

6. GIVEN THE ELEMENTS ALREADY AVAILABLE, AND UNLIMITED FINANCIAL RESOURCES, STATE THOUGHT THERE MIGHT BE A CHANCE OF ARRANGING A GOOD PRESENTATION IN TIME FOR 26 NOVEMBER. IN DISCUSSION, A NUMBER OF DETAILED POINTS AROSE:

- WOULD SECURITY COUNCIL RULES OF PROCEDURE PERMIT LIVE 5 APPEARANCES BY KUWAITI EYE-WITNESSES? WE THOUGHT THEY WOULD BUT, IF NOT, THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE VIDEOTAPED.
- WHAT VISUAL MATERIAL WAS AVAILABLE? THE AMERICANS THOUGHT THERE WAS IN FACT VERY LITTLE GOOD POST-INVASION FOOTAGE. THEY REMARKED THAT THIS HAD BEEN THE VIEW AT THE UK/US INFORMATION TALKS ON 12 NOVEMBER.
- FORMAT? THE OBVIOUS FORMAT SEEMED TO BE TO HAVE A SCRIPTED PRESENTATION INTERSPERSED WITH FILM/VIDEO CLIPS AND PERSONAL TESTIMONY.
- WHO SHOULD BE THE MAIN PRESENTER? GNEHM AGREED WITH BLACKLEY (JEDDA TELNO 256) THAT THE AMIR WOULD NOT BE TOUGH ENOUGH. HE ALSO THOUGHT THAT MUTAWA, WHILE GOOD, WAS TOO LOW IN THE PECKING ORDER, WHICH WOULD CAUSE PROBLEMS ON THE KUWAITI SIDE. HE THOUGHT THE CROWN-PRINCE OR SHAIKH SABAH WOULD BE BETTER, THOUGH NEITHER WAS IDEAL.

7. GNEHM SAID THAT HE WOULD TELEPHONE MUTAWA IN TAIF TOMORROW (17 NOVEMBER) TO REINFORCE THE MESSAGE. GNEHM HIMSELF WOULD BE FLYING TO SAUDI ARABIA ON SUNDAY. HE WOULD CONSULT WITH BLACKLEY ON ARRIVAL WITH A VIEW TO A JOINT DEMARCHE. HE SAID THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO DECIDE EARLY NEXT WEEK (NO LATER THAN TUESDAY) WHETHER THE KUWAITIS WERE LIKELY TO BE ABLE TO PRODUCE

AN ADEQUATE PRESENTATION. IF NOT, WE MIGHT HAVE TO RECOMMEND CANCELLATION RATHER THAN RISK A FIASCO. WOLF, HOWEVER, NOTED THAT SECRETARY BAKER REMAINED VERY KEEN ON A DEBATE FROM 26 NOVEMBER ONWARDS. WE AGREED THAT WE HAD TO ENSURE THAT WE PROVIDED THE KUWAITIS WITH SUFFICIENT GUIDANCE SO THAT THE JOB WAS WELL DONE.

8. WE AGREED THAT, ONCE GNEHM AND BLACKLEY HAD APPROACHED THE KUWAITIS ON SUNDAY, WE WOULD NEED TO LOBBY OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO PARTICIPATE - NOTABLY THOSE WHOSE GUEST-WORKERS HAD SUFFERED SINCE IRAQ'S INVASION. ACTION WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN VERY EARLY NEXT WEEK. TIME WOULD BE NEEDED TO ASSEMBLE THIRD COUNTRY WITNESSES ETC AND GET THEM TO NEW YORK. WE AGREED IT WOULD BE BETTER IF WE WENT IN IN SUPPORT OF THE KUWAITIS IN GCC AND OTHER FRIENDLY ARAB CAPITALS. THIS WAS SOMETHING WHICH BLACKLEY AND GNEHM COULD DISCUSS WITH THE KUWAITIS.

WOOD

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