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SECRET

FM UKMIS NEW YORK
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1980
OF 151550Z NOVEMBER 90
INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, MOSCOW, PEKING, WASHINGTON

MY TELNO 1966 AND WASHINGTON TELNO 2783: IRAQ/KUWAIT: NEXT STEPS AT THE UNITED NATIONS

SUMMARY

1. PICKERING OUTLINES AMERICAN THINKING ON PROCEDURE, SUBSTANCE AND TIMING FOR THE NEXT STEPS. ACTION IN NEW YORK ON HOLD WHILE BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS IN PARIS AND IN CAPITALS WITH THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS GET UNDER WAY.

DETAIL

2. THE U S PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE GAVE ME BREAKFAST ON 15 NOVEMBER AND DEBRIEFED ME THOROUGHLY ON HIS TALKS IN WASHINGTON IN THE MORNING OF 14 NOVEMBER. I HAD NOT AT THAT STAGE SEEN THE ACCOUNT OF SIR A. ACLAND'S CONVERSATION WITH KIMMITT IN WASHINGTON TUR.) PICKERING UNDERLINED THAT ALL THIS PRE-DATED THE TALKS WHICH THE PRESIDENT AND BAKER HAD WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS LATER THAT DAY BUT HE HAD NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THEIR VIEWS HAD CHANGED AS A RESULT OF THOSE MEETINGS.

3. PICKERING SAID THAT, BROADLY SPEAKING, A LOT OF PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE IN HIS TALKS IN WASHINGTON AND MANY OF THE POINTS HE AND I HAD SUGGESTED (MY TELNOS 1940 AND 1941) HAD NOW BEEN TAKEN ON BOARD. MORE SPECIFICALLY:

I) IT HAD FIRMLY REGISTERED AND BEEN AGREED THAT THE SELLING OF BOTH THE PRINCIPLE OF A RESOLUTION AUTHORISING THE MILITARY OPTION AND A TEXT MUST BE DONE AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL AND IN CAPITALS. THAT IMPLIED HIGH LEVEL CONTACT WITH THE FRENCH AND THE RUSSIANS THIS WEEKEND AND POSSIBLE FOLLOW UP THEREAFTER IN THEIR CAPITALS AND A SEPARATE EMISSARY TO PEKING. IN ADDITION BAKER WOULD BE MEETING THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF ETHIOPIA, IVORY COAST AND ZAIRE IN GENEVA AND WAS PLANNING A VISIT TO BOGOTA (ALTHOUGH THIS MIGHT BE A LITTLE BIT TOO LATE FOR THE CURRENT OPERATION).

II) THE DRAFT WE HAD PASSED THEM HAD BEEN MUCH WELCOMED AND FITTED MORE OR LESS EXACTLY THEIR OWN THINKING. IT WOULD, WITH VERY FEW CHANGES, FORM THE BASIS FOR CONSULTATION. THE ONE POINT THAT HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED IN WASHINGTON AS NEEDING SOME CHANGE WAS THE

REFERENCE TO THE RESTORATION OF THE KUWAITI REGIME WHICH, TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF FRENCH SUSCEPTIBILITIES, MIGHT NEED TO BE HANDLED LESS DIRECTLY EG BY A CROSS-REFERENCE TO ONE OF THE EARLIER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS.

III) IT WAS AGREED THAT 'PEACE' LANGUAGE SHOULD NOT BE PROFFERED AT THIS STAGE.

IV) IT WAS AGREED THAT THE IDEA OF SETTING A DATE IN THE FUTURE AFTER WHICH THE MILITARY OPTION COULD BE AVAILABLE SHOULD ALSO NOT BE PURSUED AT THIS STAGE, ALTHOUGH IT MIGHT COME BACK INTO PLAY IN THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS.

V) ON TIMING, THE IDEA HE AND I HAD DISCUSSED FOR STARTING THE KUWAITI DESPOLIATION SHOW DURING THE WEEK BEGINNING 26 NOVEMBER, FOLLOWED AT THE END OF THAT WEEK OR EARLY THE NEXT BY THE DEBATE ON THE MILITARY OPTION RESOLUTION WAS BROADLY ACCEPTED, BUT WAS REGARDED AS THE FASTEST TRACK PRACTICABLE. DEPENDING ON CONSULTATIONS WITH THE PERMANENT FIVE THE TIMETABLE MIGHT HAVE TO BE SLOWED DOWN A LITTLE. IT WAS THE FIRM VIEW IN WASHINGTON THAT THE KUWAIT DESPOLIATION SHOW SHOULD NOT BE LAUNCHED ON A TIMESCALE WHICH LEFT ANY RISK OF IT BECOMING DECOUPLED FROM THE MILITARY OPTION RESOLUTION DEBATE. THE SWITCH OF SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENCIES FROM THE U S TO YEMEN WAS REGARDED AS OF SECONDARY IMPORTANCE AND NOT A DETERMINING FACTOR.

4. I ASKED PICKERING WHAT, IF ANY, ACTION HE WAS NOW INSTRUCTED TO TAKE IN NEW YORK AND WHAT THE UNITED STATES PROPOSED TO DO TO TEE UP THE KUWAIT DESPOLIATION SHOW. PICKERING SAID THAT, SO FAR AS NEW YORK WAS CONCERNED, HE WAS FIRMLY ON HOLD WHILE THE BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS IN PARIS AND CAPITALS WITH THE PERMANENT FIVE GOT UNDER WAY. THE US AMBASSADOR TO KUWAIT WAS ALREADY IN CONTACT WITH THE KUWAITIS AND WITH THOSE PARTS OF THE US ADMINISTRATION WHICH HAD BEEN DEALING WITH PUBLICITY MATERIAL ON DESPOLIATION. HE IMAGINED THE ISSUE WOULD FIGURE PROMINENTLY IN THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO THE ARABIAN PENINSULA NEXT WEEK. WASHINGTON HAD NOT YET DECIDED WHETHER TO RUN THE SMALL KUWAITI DRAFT RESOLUTION AT THE END OF THIS WEEK AS A SEPARATE EXERCISE AND A KIND OF PRECURSOR TO THE MAIN DESPOLIATION SHOW OR WHETHER TO FOLD IT INTO THAT LARGER OPERATION. (THIS RESOLUTION SENT TO THE DEPARTMENT UNDER CLIFF'S LETTER OF 14 NOVEMBER TO MS EVANS, WOULD ENTRUST TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL A COPY OF THE REGISTER RECORDING THE CITIZENS OF KUWAIT ON 1 AUGUST 1990).

5. I PASSED ON TO PICKERING THE ADVICE GIVEN BY SIR E FERGUSSON (PARIS TELNO 1377) ABOUT THE DESIRABILITY OF A SEPARATE AND FREE-STANDING U S APPROACH AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL TO THE FRENCH THIS WEEKEND IN PARIS. PICKERING SAID THIS SOUNDED VERY GOOD SENSE TO HIM

AND HE WOULD FEED THAT INTO WASHINGTON IMMEDIATELY.

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