

CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKMIS NEW YORK
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1836
OF 030330Z NOVEMBER 90
INFO IMMEDIATE EC POSTS, WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD, AMMAN, RIYADH

YOUR TELNO 891: BRANDT MISSION TO IRAQ

SUMMARY

1. SECRETARY-GENERAL RESISTS FURTHER ATTEMPTS TO PERSUADE HIM TO GIVE A UN LABEL TO A VISIT BY PROMINENT EUROPEANS TO BAGHDAD.

DETAIL

2. THERE HAS CONTINUED TO BE A GREAT DEAL OF CONFUSED ACTIVITY HERE DIRECTED UNSUCCESSFULLY AT PERSUADING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO GIVE SOME KIND OF UN COVER TO THE VISIT TO BAGHDAD BY BRANDT AND SUCH OTHER EUROPEAN WORTHIES AS MIGHT GO WITH HIM. THE MAIN EVENTS THAT I HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PIECE TOGETHER FROM CONTACTS WITH THE NETHERLANDS AND ITALIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES AND WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S CHEF DE CABINET ARE AS FOLLOWS:

- (I) A DUTCH APPROACH: VAN DEN BROEK, UNDER GREAT DOMESTIC PRESSURE ONCE THE NEWS OF THE BRANDT VISIT HAD BROKEN IN NEW YORK, TELEPHONED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON 1 NOVEMBER. PEREZ DE CUELLAR CONTINUED TO FEND HIM OFF, AS HE HAD DONE GENSCHER AND ANDREOTTI THE DAY BEFORE (MY TELNO 1793).
- (II) A FURTHER GERMAN APPROACH: GENSCHER SPOKE AGAIN TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON 2 NOVEMBER TO TRY TO PERSUADE HIM TO CHANGE HIS MIND AND AT THE VERY LEAST TO GIVE THE BRANDT MISSION A PUBLIC BLESSING. PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD CONTINUED TO RESIST AND GENSCHER HAD FINALLY GIVEN UP.
- (III) A FURTHER ITALIAN APPROACH: THE ITALIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE WAS SENT IN ON INSTRUCTIONS TO SEE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL LATE THIS AFTERNOON TO INSIST THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR RECONSIDER HIS NEGATIVE REACTION TO ANDREOTTI'S APPROACH. PEREZ DE CUELLAR GAVE TRAXLER AN ACCOUNT OF HIS DISCUSSION WITH GENSCHER AND SAID THIS WAS REALLY ALL WATER UNDER THE BRIDGE NOW. THERE WAS NO POINT IN THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT GOING ON PRESSING HIM. HE REVEALED THAT HE HAD IN FACT TALKED TO THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR ON 1 NOVEMBER TO FIND OUT WHAT THE IRAQI REACTION WOULD BE TO BRANDT, WITH OR WITHOUT COMPANIONS, COMING WITH A UN LABEL. AL-ANBARI HAD REPLIED WITH THE GREATEST CLARITY THAT:

- (A) THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HIS OFFICIALS WERE CONSIDERED IN IRAQ TO BE AN EXTENSION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND AS SUCH HOSTILE.
- (B) ALL MATTERS RELATING TO HOSTAGES AND TO THIRD COUNTRY WORKERS IN IRAQ HAD TO BE HANDLED ON A BILATERAL BASIS AND NOT A MULTILATERAL ONE. HENCE IRAQ'S UNWILLINGNESS TO DEAL WITH THE ICRC ~~BUT~~ THEIR WILLINGNESS TO HAVE BILATERAL DEALINGS WITH NATIONAL RED CROSS OR RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES.
- (C) BRANDT AS AN INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE VERY WELCOME IN IRAQ. IF HE WERE GIVEN A UN LABEL HE WOULD NOT BE ADMITTED OR RECEIVED.

3. TRAXLER SAID HE WOULD BE REPORTING ALL THIS TO HIS GOVERNMENT. HE ASSUMED THAT, IN THE LIGHT OF THIS VERY CLEAR POSITION, THEY WOULD NOT PERSIST ANY FURTHER. BUT FEELINGS IN ROME WERE EXTREMELY BRUISED, WITH MUCH IRRITATION DIRECTED PARTICULARLY TOWARDS THE GERMANS. THE ITALIAN PREDICAMENT WAS ACUTE NOW, SINCE BRANDT WOULD BE GOING ON A PURELY BILATERAL BASIS, AND COULD THEREFORE BE EXPECTED ONLY TO GET OUT GERMAN HOSTAGES. HE BELIEVED COLOMBO WOULD NOT BE GOING.

4. I GAVE BOTH PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES AN ACCOUNT OF YOUR CONVERSATION WITH VAN DEN BROEK AND THE LINE YOU WOULD TAKE IN ANY FURTHER CONVERSATION YOU MIGHT HAVE WITH DE MICHELIS. WE REMAINED OF THE VIEW THAT ANY GROUP OF THIS SORT, WITH OR WITHOUT A UN LABEL, WOULD BE DAMAGING TO THE OVERALL OBJECTIVE OF ISOLATING AND BRINGING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON SADDAM HUSSEIN AND WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS. WE COULD CERTAINLY NOT AGREE TO ANY SUCH APPROACH TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL BEING PRESENTED TO HIM AS AN EC APPROACH. TRAXLER SAID HE TOOK THE LAST POINT. HE LATER TOLD ME THAT HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WHEN HE SAW HIM (PARA 2(III) ABOVE) THAT HE WAS SPEAKING ON A NATIONAL BASIS AND NOT ON BEHALF OF THE TWELVE.

5. PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S CHEF DE CABINET SAID THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CHANGING HIS MIND. HE DID NOT INTEND TO ANOINT ANYONE IN THIS GROUP. THE WHOLE MANOEUVRE HAD BEEN A DISCREDITABLE ONE WHICH MADE NO SENSE AT ALL. IT BEGAN AS A RATHER SHADY MANOEUVRE TO BRING THE VISIT INTO CONFORMITY WITH THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL BUT, GIVEN THE IRAQI ATTITUDE TOWARDS A UN LABEL, IT HAD SEEMED TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR MORE AND MORE AS IF HE WERE BEING MANIPULATED TO BRING ABOUT THE ABORTING OF THE BRANDT MISSION. I ASKED DAYAL TO ENSURE THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL UNDERSTOOD THAT OUR POSITION HAD NOT CHANGED AS A RESULT OF ALL THIS TOING AND FROING. WE SUPPORTED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S EFFORTS TO

CONFIDENTIAL

031502
MDHIAN 7516

GET SADRUDDIN AGA KHAN INTO IRAQ. HE SAID OUR POSITION WAS
ABSOLUTELY CLEAR, AND HE WOULD CONVEY IT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

HANNAY

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION 273

MAIN 229

IRAQ/KUWAIT
LIMITED

MED

ADDITIONAL 44

IRAQ/KUWAIT
(PASSED TO EMERGENCY UNIT)

NNNN

PAGE 3
CONFIDENTIAL