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IRAQ/KUWAIT: NEXT STEPS AT THE UN

## SUMMARY

1. IN RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC POLITICAL PRESSURES, US URGING UNSG TO MOVE QUICKLY ON HUMANITARIAN ELEMENTS OF SCR 674. US ALSO SWINGING AWAY FROM PRESSING A SEQUENCE OF SINGLE ISSUE RESOLUTIONS TOWARDS 2 OR 3 MULTI-PURPOSE RESOLUTIONS.

## DETAIL

2. THE MINISTER CALLED ON WOLF (DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, IO), IN BOLTON'S ABSENCE IN NEW YORK, ON 2 NOVEMBER. WOLF SAID THAT DURING HIS CURRENT CAMPAIGN SWEEP, THE PRESIDENT HAD FOUND A GREAT DEAL OF NATIONAL CONCERN ABOUT THE SITUATION OF US CITIZENS IN KUWAIT. BOLTON HAD THEREFORE BEEN URGENTLY DESPACHED TO PRESS THE UNSG TO MOVE QUICKLY IN HIS EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT PARA 7 OF SCR 674, PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS THE EVACUATION OF THIRD STATE NATIONALS AND THE REPROVISIONING OF DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS. THERE MIGHT BE POSSIBILITIES HERE FOR BRINGING THE ICRC INTO PLAY. THE STATE DEPARTMENT WOULD ISSUE A STATEMENT TODAY NOTING THAT THE IRAQIS COULD ASSIST REPROVISIONING BY TURNING ON WATER AND ELECTRICITY TO DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS AND PROVIDING FOOD, CLOTHES AND CLEAN SHELTER TO THIRD STATE NATIONALS. IF THEY WERE NOT PREPARED TO DO THIS THEMSELVES THEY SHOULD PERMIT EXTERNAL REPROVISIONING.

3. STATE WERE NOT OVERLY OPTIMISTIC THAT THEIR EFFORTS WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL. BUT IT WAS IMPERATIVE TO DEMONSTRATE CONTINUING US SERIOUSNESS ON THIS ISSUE AND TO EXPLORE EVERY POSSIBLE AVENUE OF IMPLEMENTATION. STATE FEARED THAT WITHOUT REPROVISIONING THE US EMBASSY MIGHT BE FORCED TO CLOSE BY THE END OF NOVEMBER. THIS WOULD BE QUOTE A SYMBOLIC VICTORY FOR SADDAM AND A POLITICAL DEFEAT FOR US UNQUOTE. HE ADDED, HOWEVER QUOTE BUT WE COULD SURVIVE THE HUMILIATION UNQUOTE.

4. ON THE QUESTION OF FURTHER GULF RESOLUTIONS DURING THE US PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL, WOLF SAID THAT THEIR TACTICS HAD EVOLVED (AND INDICATED THAT THINKING CHANGED ALMOST DAY TO DAY). INSTEAD OF THE GAMEPLAN OF A SERIES OF SINGLE-ISSUE RESOLUTIONS (MY TELNO 2654), THE US WERE NOW CONSIDERING A COUPLE OF MULTI-PURPOSE RESOLUTIONS:

I - COMPENSATION/REPARATIONS PLUS WAR CRIMES: THIS WAS A NEW LINKAGE. THE US WERE AWARE OF UK CONCERN ABOUT THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS ON COMPENSATION/REPARATIONS, BUT LEGAL ADVISERS WOULD BE DISCUSSING THIS ON 5 NOVEMBER. ON WAR CRIMES, WOLF SAID THAT THE US WERE NOT SEEKING TO ESTABLISH NUREMBURG-TYPE INSTITUTIONS. INSTEAD, THEY WISHED TO LAY OUT QUOTE CATEGORIES OF MORAL OBLIGATION UNQUOTE. FAILURE BY IRAQ TO COMPLY WITH THESE WOULD RESULT IN INTERNATIONAL CONDEMNATION. THE OBJECTIVE WAS TO MAKE PEOPLE CLOSE TO SADDAM REALISE THAT THEY WERE IN QUOTE PERSONAL PERIL UNQUOTE.

BUT THE PRECISE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION WOULD DEPEND LARGELY ON THE OUTCOME OF THE CRISIS. IF IT ENDED IN WAR, THE IMPLICATIONS FOR SENIOR IRAQIS WOULD BE MUCH MORE SERIOUS.

II - MEASURES AGAINST SANCTIONS VIOLATORS: TO THIS IDEA WOULD NOW BE ADDED A CUT OFF OF SERVICES AND (A NEW ELEMENT) A PROVISION IN THE RESOLUTION TO ENSURE THE CONTINUING APPLICABILITY OF SCR 661 EVEN AFTER A POSSIBLE IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT. THE IDEA HERE WAS TO ENSURE THAT SANCTIONS COULD NOT BE LIFTED AUTOMATICALLY ON IRAQI WITHDRAWAL, BUT WOULD REQUIRE THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE REFERENCE IN PARA 12 OF SCR 674 TO THE NEED TO RESTORE PEACE, SECURITY AND STABILITY IN THE GULF, BY EXTENDING THE PARAMETERS OF SCR 660, ALREADY PROVIDED A BASIS FOR US THINKING ON THIS ISSUE, BUT IT WAS NECESSARY TO MAKE THE CONTINUING APPLICABILITY OF SANCTIONS MORE EXPLICIT.

5. WOLF SAID THAT IF A FURTHER RESOLUTION WAS NEEDED, IT WAS LIKELY TO BE QUOTE MORE MILITARISTIC UNQUOTE. MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON WHAT EMERGED FROM BAKER'S FORTHCOMING VISIT TO THE GULF. IF AS A RESULT OF THIS THE US THOUGHT THAT FURTHER UNCOVER WAS NEEDED (UNDER ARTICLE 42 OR 53), THEN THE BEST WINDOW WAS LIKELY TO BE DURING THE US PRESIDENCY.

6. ON ARAB/ISRAEL, WOLF SAID THAT THE US WERE THINKING CAREFULLY ABOUT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT. THERE WAS ONE PARTICULAR POINT ON WHICH THEY WOULD WELCOME UK SUPPORT. IF IT TURNED OUT THAT THERE WAS TO BE A MEETING OF THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES, THE US THOUGHT STRONGLY THAT THIS SHOULD NOT BE IN NEW YORK. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO HAVE THE DEBATE IN GENEVA, AWAY FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE POLITICALLY CHARGED ATMOSPHERE OF NEW YORK. MORE THOUGHT WOULD BE NEEDED ON THIS.

7. WOLF STRESSED AGAIN THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WERE LOOKING FORWARD TO SIR D HANNEY'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON. WE WILL BE REPORTING SEPARATELY ON OTHER MATTERS OF IMPORTANCE TO THE AMERICANS DURING THEIR PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL.

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