

19a-d

Jp 01173

MR POWELL

We shall have to read - this view at every opportunity. It is the right one. The could put our forces at 256X.

The Gulf: US Views on UN Authority for Military Action

The Prime Minister may wish to see these two telegrams, which supplement my minute to her of 24 October. Kimmitt was called away suddenly from our meeting to attend Baker, who had to receive Prince Bandar.

2. The argument in telegram 2589 is a predictable one and it is natural that the State Department should deploy it. There was a general feeling during my visit that of course a further resolution authorising force would be ideal, provided always we could get it quickly and in the form we wanted. But the problem lies in the proviso. Nor do I find convincing the assurance that an approach would only be made to the UN if it was clear that it would succeed. There are two snags. First, although our private consultations might lead us to believe everything was sewn up, matters could change rapidly once the resolution was revealed to a wider audience. Secondly, there could be no guarantee that private consultations would not leak, giving the Iraqis the warning they want. I made these points elsewhere in my rounds.

3. The idea that we might seek in November additional authority for military action at some unspecified time in the future is also similar to ideas I heard from Wolfowitz. I do not find the argument that operational security would be preserved thereby entirely persuasive. It is true Saddam might not know the precise time of the allied attack; but he would have been put on notice that one was much more likely, if not inevitable. He would therefore be prompted to take pre-emptive moves whether military or diplomatic and plenty of time to mount them.

25 October 1990

PERCY CRADOCK

ZCZC

b

OO CAOFF

SECRET

OO FCOLN NYMIS CAOFF

FM WASHI TO FCOLN

242355Z OCT

GRS 500

SECRET

DEDIP

FM WASHINGTON

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 2589

OF 242355Z OCTOBER 90

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, CABINET OFFICER

FCO PERSONAL FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY, PS/PUS AND SIR PERCY CRADOCK,
CABINET OFFICE

NEW YORK PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR

UKMIS NEW YORK PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR

THE GULF: AUTHORITY FOR THE MILITARY OPTION

1. I HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK TO KIMMITT ALONE ON 24 OCTOBER
ABOUT THE OPTIONS FOR FUTURE ACTIVITY IN THE UN, AND THE
POSSIBILITY OF A FURTHER APPROACH TO AUTHORISE MILITARY ACTION.

2. KIMMITT REPEATED THAT THE US ADMINISTRATION CONSIDERED THAT ARTICLE 51 GAVE SUFFICIENT AUTHORITY. IN ADDITION THEY DID NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE DIFFICULTIES OF GETTING A SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION THROUGH. THERE WAS, HOWEVER, ONE IMPORTANT INTERNAL POLITICAL CONSIDERATION, OF WHICH WE SHOULD BE AWARE. IT WOULD BE MUCH EASIER TO OBTAIN CONGRESSIONAL ACQUIESCENCE OVER MILITARY ACTION (POSSIBLY THROUGH A FORMAL VOTE) IF CONGRESS COULD BE ASKED TO ACT IN SUPPORT OF AUTHORITY GIVEN BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS, RATHER THAN RISK A DIFFICULT DISCUSSION ON WHERE AUTHORITY FOR COMMITTING US FORCES TO ACTION LAY UNDER THE WAR POWERS ACT. BAKER HAD ALREADY HAD A DIFFICULT TIME WITH CONGRESS ON THIS ISSUE.

3. KIMMITT ADDED THAT IN VIEW OF THE RUN OF NOT VERY HELPFUL SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENTS FOLLOWING THE UNITED STATES IN NOVEMBER, AND WITH INDIA, ZIMBABWE AND AUSTRIA COMING ON THE COUNCIL IN THE NEW YEAR, SOME THOUGHT WAS NOW BEING GIVEN TO OBTAINING ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY FOR MILITARY ACTION, DURING THE US PRESIDENCY. THE ADDED ADVANTAGE OF THIS WAS THAT OPERATIONAL SECURITY WOULD BE PRESERVED. TO ACT AT THE LAST MINUTE COULD GIVE THE GAME AWAY TO SADDAM HUSSEIN THAT AN ATTACK WAS IMMINENT.

4. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF KIMMITT'S CONFIDENCE COULD BE RESPECTED AND IF THIS COULD BE TREATED AS FOR BACKGROUND INFORMATION ONLY UNTIL US REPRESENTATIVES RAISE THIS WITH US IN A MORE DEFINITE WAY.

ACLAND

YYYY

ORWBAN 9406

NNNN

ZCZC

d

LNCYAN 1410 ORWBAN 9407

CONFIDENTIAL

OO CAOFF

FM WASHI TO CAOFF

242359Z OCT

GRS 128

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON

TO IMMEDIATE CABINET OFFICE

TELNO MISC 377

OF 242359Z OCTOBER 90

PERSONAL FOR SIR PERCY CRADOCK FROM AMBASSADOR

THE GULF

1. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN MY TELNO 2589 TO FCO. KIMMITT SAID THAT HE WAS VERY SORRY THAT HE HAD HAD TO LEAVE THE MEETING WITH YOU SO ABRUPTLY. HE HAD MUCH ENJOYED THE EXCHANGE, AND WOULD HAVE LIKED IT TO CONTINUE. HE HAD PARTICULARLY WANTED TO TELL YOU OF THE CONSIDERATION IN MY TUR. IT WAS NOT OF COURSE OVER-RIDING, BUT WAS SOMETHING WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT. HE REMAINED OF THE VIEW THAT AN APPROACH SHOULD ONLY BE MADE IN THE UNITED NATIONS IF IT WAS CLEAR THAT IT WOULD SUCCEED. IF NOT, THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD HAVE TO RELY ON ARTICLE 51 AND MANAGE THE CONGRESSIONAL ASPECT AS BEST THEY COULD.

ACLAND

YYYY