

CONFIDENTIAL  
FM UKMIS NEW YORK  
TO DESKBY 170700Z FCO  
TELNO 1655  
OF 170415Z OCTOBER 90  
INFO DESKBY 170700Z JERUSALEM  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, PEKING

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JERUSALEM FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY

YOUR TELNO 818: NEXT STEPS ON IRAQ/KUWAIT

SUMMARY

1. DISCUSSION WITH THE AMERICANS AND IN THE FIVE ON THE NEXT STEPS RESOLUTION. CONTINUING UK/U S DIFFERENCES OVER ITS SCOPE: DISCUSSION TO RESUME ON 17 OCTOBER. RUSSIANS PROPOSE MEETING OF CHIEFS OF STAFF OF THE FIVE.

DETAIL

2. AS FORESHADOWED IN MY TELNO 1636, ON THE MORNING OF 16 OCTOBER I MET MY U S COLLEAGUE TO TAKE FORWARD DISCUSSION ON THE NEXT STEPS RESOLUTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THREE TEXTS WERE CIRCULATED AT THE MEETING:

- A) OUR DRAFT FOCUSING ON COMPENSATION/PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
- B) A SHORT DRAFT PREPARED IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT, WITH THE MUCH NARROWER SCOPE PICKERING HAD OUTLINED TO ME ON 15 OCTOBER (PARA 2 OF MY TELNO 1636):
- C) A MUCH LONGER DRAFT, PREPARED IN THE U S MISSION AND COVERING ALL OF THE OTHER TOPICS EARLIER DISCUSSED BETWEEN OUR TWO MISSIONS.

PICKERING SAID THAT AFTER CONSULTATION WITH WASHINGTON HE HAD ESTABLISHED THAT THE AIM WAS TO PRODUCE SOMETHING LYING IN BETWEEN THE PARAMETERS REPRESENTED BY THE TWO U S DRAFTS.

3. PICKERING SAID HE THOUGHT WASHINGTON WOULD BE PREPARED TO INCLUDE SOMETHING ON COMPENSATION IN THE DRAFT RESOLUTION IF IT LOOKED AS THOUGH IT COULD STILL GET THROUGH QUICKLY. BUT WASHINGTON HAD SOME DOUBTS ABOUT REFERENCES TO PLACING IRAQI ASSETS IN TRUST. HE ENVISAGED THAT THE FINAL DRAFT MIGHT INCLUDE SOMETHING ON HOSTAGES, LANGUAGE PICKING UP THE CUBAN/YEMENI 'PEACE OFFENSIVE' AND

SOMETHING ON THE PROVISION OF FOOD AND WATER TO THE EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT: BUT THE AMERICANS WOULD NOT WANT TO GO THE FULL DISTANCE EARLIER DISCUSSED WITH US AND INCLUDE PROVISIONS ON IMPOUNDING TRUCKS OR REGIONAL CO-OPERATION UNDER ARTICLE 53. PICKERING WONDERED WHETHER PARAGRAPH 4 OF OUR DRAFT (PROVIDING THAT FROZEN ASSETS SHOULD BE HELD IN TRUST) WAS NECESSARY.

4. I SAID THAT I HAD TRAILED THE IDEAS IN THE SHORTER U S DRAFT WITH LONDON. YOU HAD BEEN UNDERWHELMED: ESSENTIALLY IT WENT OVER OLD GROUND. WE REMAINED ATTACHED TO THE IDEA OF COVERING COMPENSATION AND INCLUDING SOMETHING BRIEF ON PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY. IF WE AIMED FOR NO MORE THAN WAS IN THE SHORT U S DRAFT IT WOULD LOOK AS IF WE WERE PANICKING. OUR IDEAS ON COMPENSATION COULD PROBABLY RUN WITHOUT PARAGRAPH 4 OF OUR DRAFT, IF THE AMERICANS FELT THIS WOULD HELP. IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE INSTEAD TO PROVIDE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A REGISTER OF CLAIMS.

5. IT WAS QUICKLY AGREED THAT WE SHOULD DRAW UP A SINGLE DRAFT WHICH WOULD INCLUDE ALL OUR MATERIAL ON COMPENSATION/PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND SOME OF THE IDEAS FROM THE LONGER U S RESOLUTION (COPY ALREADY FAXED TO THE DEPARTMENT). THIS WOULD THEN BE PUT FORWARD JOINTLY AT A MEETING OF THE FIVE LATER IN THE DAY. THIS PLAN HAD TO BE ABORTED, HOWEVER, WHEN WE DISCOVERED THAT BAKER HAD GONE ON RECORD IN WASHINGTON TO FORESHADOW A UN RESOLUTION OF MORE LIMITED SCOPE, DEALING ONLY WITH SUCH HUMANITARIAN ISSUES AS THE RE-SUPPLY OF FOOD AND WATER TO FOREIGN EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT. PICKERING TOLD ME THAT AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND HE HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO PUT FORWARD YET ANOTHER DRAFT, PREPARED IN WASHINGTON, WHICH WAS ON MUCH MORE RESTRICTED LINES. AT HIS SUGGESTION I AGREED THAT I WOULD PUT FORWARD THE FULLER UK/U S DRAFT AS MY OWN.

6. WHEN AMBASSADORS OF THE FIVE MET IN THE AFTERNOON PICKERING INTRODUCED HIS DRAFT, SAYING THAT HE HOPED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO MOVE FORWARD QUICKLY WITH IT IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. I CIRCULATED MY ALTERNATIVE TEXT. I SAID THAT MY GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN ANXIOUS FOR SOME TIME TO TACKLE THE QUESTION OF COMPENSATION. THE IRAQIS WERE INFLECTING MASSIVE DAMAGE ON KUWAIT, AND ON THE INTERESTS THERE OF THIRD COUNTRIES AND THEIR NATIONALS. THE PROVISIONS OUTLINED IN OUR DRAFT WERE NOT CONTENTIOUS OR PUNITIVE, BUT SIMPLY COMMON SENSE. NOT ONLY OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL BUT ALSO OTHER DEVELOPING COUNTRIES SHOULD BE ATTRACTED BY THIS APPROACH: AFTER ALL THEY WERE THE ONES WHO WOULD BENEFIT. ON THE OTHER HAND WE FELT THAT THE U S DRAFT DID NOT HAVE ENOUGH CONTENT: IT REPEATED POSITIONS RATHER THAN RATCHETING UP THE PRESSURE ON THE IRAQIS.

7. THERE WAS LITTLE DISCUSSION OF THE RIVAL TEXTS. VORONTSOV (SOVIET UNION) DID NOT GO BEYOND A FEW COMMENTS ON DETAILS. YU (CHINA) AND BLANC (FRANCE) SAID THEY WOULD SEEK INSTRUCTIONS: BUT THE FRENCH TOLD US AFTER THE MEETING THAT THEY EXPECTED PARIS TO FAVOUR OUR APPROACH.

8. VORONTSOV THEN WENT ON TO OUTLINE WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS A ROUGH IDEA DESIGNED TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON THE IRAQIS. IN PARALLEL WITH THE PASSING OF THE NEXT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION (WHICHEVER ONE IT WAS) THE CHIEFS OF STAFF OF THE FIVE SHOULD MEET IN THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE (MSC) TO BEGIN DISCUSSIONS. THIS WOULD BE A THREAT TO IRAQ, EVEN IF NOTHING VERY SUBSTANTIAL CAME OUT OF THE DISCUSSION. AT LEAST THE CHIEFS OF STAFF WOULD HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION IN THE GULF. THEY MIGHT MEET FOR A DAY OR SO AND THEN GO BACK TO THEIR CAPITALS.

9. UNDER CLOSE QUESTIONING FROM THE OTHER FOUR VORONTSOV EXPANDED ON HIS IDEA. HE SAID HE DID NOT ENVISAGE ANYTHING TOO FORMAL OR RIGID IN TERMS OF FORMAT. IT WOULD BE PRESENTATIONALLY IMPORTANT FOR THE CHIEFS OF STAFF TO MEET IN UNIFORM RATHER THAN CIVILIAN CLOTHES. THIS COULD BE SEEN AS A BEGINNING OF THE MSC'S ACTIVITY, BUT IT NEED NOT BE DESCRIBED AS SUCH. IF THE MEETING TOOK PLACE OUTSIDE THE FORMAL FRAMEWORK OF THE MSC, AS A CONTINUATION OF THE INFORMAL AD HOC DISCUSSION OF MSC MEMBERS ALREADY UNDERWAY, THIS WOULD ALSO BE ACCEPTABLE. HE DID NOT WANT TO SEE ANY REFERENCE TO THE MEETING IN THE COUNCIL RESOLUTION.

10. PICKERING NOTED THAT THE PREFERENCE OF HIS AUTHORITIES HAD BEEN TO CONDUCT SUCH EXCHANGES WITHIN THE FIVE RATHER THAN IN THE FORMAL SETTING OF THE MSC. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE RUSSIANS COULD VIEW THIS ASPECT FLEXIBLY. SINCE CHIEFS OF STAFF WERE BUSY PEOPLE, PERHAPS THEIR DEPUTIES COULD TAKE PART INSTEAD. VORONTSOV SEEMED OPEN TO THESE IDEAS, ALTHOUGH HE NOTED THAT THE SOVIET CHIEF OF STAFF WOULD BE ABLE TO HANDLE SUCH A MEETING PARTICULARLY WELL. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE SITUATION IN THE GULF WOULD GIVE THE DISCUSSIONS A WIDER SCOPE THAN THEY HAD HAD HITHERTO.

11. IT WAS AGREED THAT ON THIS POINT TOO WE WOULD SEEK INSTRUCTIONS OVERNIGHT. FOR THE RESOLUTION YET ANOTHER DRAFT WOULD BE PRODUCED AFTER THE MEETING, WHICH WOULD BE A CONFLATION OF THE SHORT U S TEXT AND THE LONGER UK TEXT, WITH UNAGREED PORTIONS IN SQUARE BRACKETS (TEXT FAXED TO UND AND EMERGENCY UNIT). COUNSELLORS OF THE FIVE WOULD MEET AT 171300Z TO CONTINUE WORK ON THE TEXT. AMBASSADORS

WOULD RESUME DISCUSSION AT 171400Z TO REVIEW THE DRAFT RESOLUTION AND TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON THE SOVIET IDEA OF A MEETING OF MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES.

12. SEE MIFT FOR MY COMMENTS.

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