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FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY
SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK

SUMMARY

1. ANECDOTAL ACCOUNT BY MUBARAK OF EVENTS LEADING UP TO INVASION OF KUWAIT. DESCRIBES KING HUSSEIN AS SADDAM HUSSEIN'S CAT'S PAW. MUST KEEP SANCTIONS TIGHT. BUT IN THE EVENT OF MILITARY ACTION THE IRAQIS WILL RUN AWAY.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD AN HOUR LONG MEETING WITH MUBARAK, WHO WAS ON LIVELY, IF ANECDOTAL, FORM. THE SECRETARY OF STATE BEGAN BY HANDING OVER THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE OF CONDOLENCE ON THE ASSASSINATION OF THE SPEAKER OF THE EGYPTIAN PARLIAMENT.

3. MUBARAK GAVE A VERY LENGTHY ANALYSIS OF THE NEXUS OF EGYPT/IRAQ/JORDAN RELATIONS LEADING TO THE INVASION OF KUWAIT. SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD USED KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN AGAINST EGYPT. EGYPT HAD ALWAYS BEEN CAUTIOUS IN ITS DEALINGS WITH IRAQ, AND THIS HAD BEEN PROVED RIGHT. AS FAR BACK AS 1988 KING HUSSEIN, AT SADDAM HUSSEIN'S BEHEST, HAD TRIED TO INVEIGLE EGYPT INTO A UNITED EGYPT/JORDAN/IRAQ MILITARY FORCE WHICH COULD BE USED FOR INTERVENTION IN THE GULF IF THAT PROVED NECESSARY. MUBARAK HAD WARNED THAT THIS WOULD WORRY SYRIA. HE HAD ALSO ASKED KING HUSSEIN WHETHER THE GULF STATES THEMSELVES HAD AGREED. KING HUSSEIN HAD CLAIMED THAT ALL THE GULF COUNTRIES HAD BEEN CONSULTED AND WERE CONTENT - BUT THIS WAS COMPLETELY UNTRUE. ALL THIS HAD BEEN PLANNED BY SADDAM HUSSEIN IN THE HOPE THAT HE WOULD ONE DAY BE ABLE TO ANNEX KUWAIT. EGYPT HAD REFUSED TO HAVE ANY PART OF THIS AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE.

4. IRAQ AND JORDAN HAD TRIED AGAIN TO ENMESH EGYPT THROUGH THE ARAB COOPERATION COUNCIL. BOTH KING HUSSEIN AND SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD TRIED TO GET EGYPT TO SIGN AGREEMENTS FOR TRILATERAL MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE FORCES, BUT MUBARAK HAD ABSOLUTELY REFUSED. HE HAD TOLD KING HUSSEIN THAT EGYPT WOULD NEVER AGREE TO SUCH

ARRANGEMENTS. EVEN ON THIS, KING HUSSEIN HAD LIED - SAYING THAT KING FAHD, WHO HE HAD SEEN JUST BEFORE THE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED, WOULD BE CONTENT WITH AN EGYPT/IRAQ/JORDAN MILITARY/INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION AGREEMENT. BUT IN FACT KING HUSSEIN HAD SAID NOTHING TO KING FAHD, WHO WAS VERY UPSET BY THIS DECEPTION.

5. THE LEAD-IN TO THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT HAD ALSO BEEN AN EXERCISE IN IRAQI DECEIT. WHEN MUBARAK WAS IN BAGHDAD ON 24 JULY SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD ASSURED HIM THAT HIS TROOP MOVEMENTS WERE DESIGNED ONLY TO FRIGHTEN THE KUWAITIS AND THAT IRAQ WAS NOW WILLING TO NEGOTIATE. ALL THIS WAS QUOTE A BIG FAT LIE UNQUOTE. MUBARAK HAD THEN GONE TO KUWAIT, AND HAD TOLD THE KUWAITIS THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO MAKE SOME CONCESSIONS TO THE IRAQIS BUT THAT IRAQ WOULD NOT ATTACK. BUT THE KUWAITIS HAD BEEN RELUCTANT TO GIVE IRAQ MONEY - THEY HAD ALREADY GIVEN US DOLLARS 14 BILLION IN SUPPORT AND IRAQ HAD HAD A FREE RUN OF KUWAITI FACILITIES DURING THE IRAQ/IRAQ WAR. SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD ASKED FOR A FURTHER US DOLLARS 10 BILLION BUT ONCE KUWAIT STARTED TO PAY IT WOULD NEVER STOP.

6. ONCE THE INVASION OF KUWAIT HAD TAKEN PLACE, KING HUSSEIN IMMEDIATELY CAME SCUTTLING TO CAIRO. HE HAD IMplored MUBARAK NOT TO ISSUE A STATEMENT CONDEMNING SADDAM HUSSEIN - TIME WAS NEEDED TO REACH A SOLUTION. MUBARAK AGREED TO POSTPONE BY 24 HOURS A STATEMENT CONDEMNING IRAQ, AND THE REST OF THE ARAB WORLD HAD FOLLOWED HIS LEAD. HE HAD TOLD KING HUSSEIN TO GO TO BAGHDAD AND TO TELL SADDAM HUSSEIN THAT MUBARAK WOULD CALL A LIMITED ARAB SUMMIT IN JEDDA TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM - BUT ONLY IF SADDAM SAID PRIVATELY THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT AND RESTORE THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT.

7. KING HUSSEIN HAD TELEPHONED MUBARAK FROM BAGHDAD TO SAY THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WANTED THE SUMMIT TO PROCEED. MUBARAK ENQUIRED IF KING HUSSEIN HAD RAISED THE TWO CONDITIONS? HE HAD NOT. MUBARAK SAID THAT IN THAT CASE THE CONDITIONS FOR A SUMMIT HAD NOT BEEN MET. PUBLIC OPINION IN EGYPT WOULD NOT ALLOW HIM TO REMAIN SILENT ANY LONGER, AND MUBARAK HAD THEREFORE ISSUED A STATEMENT CONDEMNING IRAQ. THE GCC, THE ARAB LEAGUE AND THE OIC HAD AGAIN FOLLOWED HIS LEAD AND DONE THE SAME.

8. SINCE THEN KING HUSSEIN HAD PUBLICLY INSULTED PRESIDENT MUBARAK. THIS WAS SAD BECAUSE KING HUSSEIN HAD BEEN A FRIEND. QUEEN NOOR HAD SNUBBED MUBARAK'S WIFE. KING HUSSEIN HAD ALSO SPREAD LIES ABOUT EGYPT, CLAIMING THAT KING HASSAN HAD TOLD HIM

THAT EGYPT WAS UNDERMINING JORDAN, BOTH POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY. BUT THIS TOO WAS A LIE AND MUBARAK DID NOT LIKE LIES.

9. HAVING RESISTED KING HUSSEIN'S BLANDISHMENTS, MUBARAK HAD NEXT BEEN SUBJECTED TO IRAQI EFFORTS TO BRIBE HIM. PRESIDENT SALEH HAD COME TO CAIRO TO WHISPER IN HIS EAR. HOW MUCH DID EGYPT OWE KUWAIT IN DEBT? SALEH SAID THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD CANCEL IT. MUBARAK HAD TOLD SALEH THAT EVERYONE KNEW THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF EGYPT EVER REPAYING THESE DEBTS TO KUWAIT. SALEH HAD THEN SAID THAT SADDAM HAD TAKEN US DOLLAR 100 MILLION FROM KUWAIT - WOULD US DOLLARS 20 BILLION BE ENOUGH TO GET EGYPT ON SIDE? GIVE ME THE MONEY AND THEN I WILL TELL YOU SAID MUBARAK.

10. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED WHAT HOPE THERE WAS FOR JORDAN. THE JORDANIANS WERE MAKING SOME EFFORTS TO MAKE SANCTIONS WORK. BUT THERE WERE LOOPHOLES. THE JORDANIANS WERE FRIGHTENED BY THEIR OWN DOMESTIC OPINION - FOR EXAMPLE BY THEIR NEWSPAPERS, SOME OF WHICH WERE FINANCED BY SADDAM HUSSEIN. ALL SAID MUBARAK WOULD HAVE HELPED KING HUSSEIN BUT KING HUSSEIN HAD NOT WANTED ANY HELP. IN HIS OPINION, KING HUSSEIN HAD KNOWN ABOUT THE INVASION OF KUWAIT IN ADVANCE, AND HAD BEEN PROMISED HELP BY SADDAM HUSSEIN.

11. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED IF, IN THE END, WE WOULD HAVE TO FORCE SADDAM OUT OF KUWAIT. MUBARAK SAID THAT SADDAM WAS IN A TIGHT CORNER. HE HAD BEEN FIGHTING FOR EIGHT YEARS AND HAD SPENT ALL IRAQ'S RESERVES - THE NATIONAL DEBT WAS ABOUT US DOLLARS 60-70 BILLION. HAVING SOLD OUT ON IRAN, HIS PEOPLE WOULD KILL HIM IF HE WITHDREW FROM KUWAIT. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED IF MUBARAK THOUGHT THAT SADDAM MIGHT MAKE A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT. MUBARAK DID NOT KNOW - BUT AGREED THAT ANY WITHDRAWAL MUST BE COMPLETE. WE MUST KEEP SANCTIONS TIGHT. IF SADDAM HAD NOT WITHDRAWN IN 4 TO 6 MONTHS THE POSITION WOULD BE VERY DIFFERENT. IF IT CAME TO WAR THE IRAQIS WOULD RUN AWAY. THEIR ARMY WAS VERY POOR AND THE LARGE AIRFORCE WAS BADLY LED - IF MUBARAK HAD SUCH AN AIRFORCE HE COULD HAVE WON THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR IN A MONTH. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED WHO THEN WOULD TAKE OVER FROM SADDAM HUSSEIN. MUBARAK SAID THAT WITH IRAQ YOU COULD NEVER TELL. SADDAM GOT Madder EVERY DAY - HE NOW GAVE HIMSELF 99 NAMES IE THE SAME AS ALLAH. IF SADDAM HUSSEIN FELL HE WOULD PROBABLY JUST BE REPLACED BY ANOTHER MADMAN, BUT AT LEAST IT WOULD BE A NEW MADMAN.

12. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED HOW THE VIOLENCE IN JERUSALEM WOULD AFFECT THE ARAB WORLD. MUBARAK THOUGHT THAT NOW THE SECURITY

COUNCIL HAD PASSED A RESOLUTION IT WOULD ALL BLOW OVER. THE BRITISH HAD PLAYED A VERY POSITIVE ROLE. THE KEY WAS TO AVOID LINKAGE BETWEEN ARAB/ISRAEL AND THE GULF. BUT IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL WITH ARAB OPINION IF THERE COULD BE SOME MOVEMENT SEPARATE FROM THE GULF. SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD WON PROPAGANDA POINTS BY HIS RHETORICA ON THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED ABOUT ARAFAT. MUBARAK SAID THAT WE HAD TO KEEP TRYING WITH HIM. IT WAS A PITY THAT HE HAD TAKEN IRAQ'S PART, BUT WE HAD TO WORK ON HIM. AT LEAST WITH ARAFAT ONE KNEW THAT WHAT HE SAID ONE DAY HE WOULD DENY THE NEXT.

13. MUBARAK DID NOT THINK THAT THERE WAS MUCH CAUSE FOR WORRY ABOUT THEVMAGHREB COUNTRIES. THE PRESIDENT OF ALGERIA WAS A NICE MAN BUT OF NO SUBSTANCE. BEN BELLA HAD LITTLE INFLUENCE ON EVENTS. AS FOR THE TUNISIANS, THEY HAD WANTED TO 2 THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARAB LEAGUE, BUT THE EGYPTIANS HAD BEEN TOUGH WITH THEM.

14. ON QADAFI, MUBARAK SAID THAT HE WAS A VERY SIMPLE MAN. HE WAS NOT WELL INFORMED AND HE NEEDED REGULAR CONTACT TO KEEP HIM IN TOUCH WITH REALITY. IT WAS NOTEWORTHY THAT HE HAD SAID VIRTUALLY NOTHING ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF US FORCES IN THE GULF. AS FOR THE YEMENIS, THEY WERE A BIT BETTER THAN THEY HAD BEEN, LARGELY AS A RESULT OF SAUDI ARM TWISTING.

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IRAQ/KUWAIT
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MR FAIRWEATHER
MR GOULDEN
MR JAY
MR SLATER
MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)

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MR APPLEYARD CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
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SIR P CRADOCK,