

SECRET AND PERSONAL

DEDIP

FROM MOSCOW

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 1697

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OF S112203Z SEPTEMBER 90

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR), MODUK (PERSONAL FOR PS/MR KING)

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

MY TELNO 1696

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH BAKER: GULF

1. BAKER SAID THE SOVIET SIDE HAD BEEN VERY POSITIVE AND FORTHCOMING AT HELSINKI. THE JOINT STATEMENT WAS A GOOD ONE. THE PRIME MINISTER'S REACTION HAD BEEN GREAT AND MUCH APPRECIATED. THE STATEMENT HAD CONTAINED STRONG CONDEMNATION OF IRAQ AND WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER ADDITIONAL MEASURES. IN RESPONSE TO THE PRESS, BAKER WAS SAYING THAT ADDITIONAL MEASURES COULD MEAN EXTRA SANCTIONS, EG SANCTIONS AGAINST SANCTIONS-BUSTERS OR MEASURES TO PREVENT TRADE BY AIR. HE WAS ALSO SAYING THAT THE STATEMENT DID NOT EXCLUDE FORCE. IT COULD COVER ACTION UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER.
2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE IN HELSINKI, PRESIDENT BUSH HAD SEEMED TO BE EMPHATIC ABOUT PULLING AMERICAN TROOPS OUT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HOW DID THAT SQUARE WITH BAKER'S REFERENCES TO THE NEED FOR A LONGER TERM PRESENCE? BAKER, TO WHOM THE POINT APPEARED TO BE A NEW ONE, SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS TALKING ABOUT GETTING TROOPS OUT AS QUICKLY AS WAS FEASIBLE BUT THIS WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE WHILE THE THREAT LASTED. IF THE THREAT DIMINISHED, CERTAINLY SOME OF THE TROOPS COULD COME OUT. THE US WANTED TO SEE REGIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURES WITH THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION IN THE LEAD AND WITH PARTICIPATION BY OTHER COUNTRIES (BY IMPLICATION OTHER THAN THE US).
3. BAKER SAID THE RUSSIANS HAD WANTED TO MENTION THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IN THE HELSINKI STATEMENT. THE AMERICANS HAD RESISTED USE OF THOSE BUZZ WORDS. THERE MUST BE NO LINKAGE. WE DID NOT WANT SADDAM HUSSEIN TO LEAVE KUWAIT TRUMPETING IT ABOARD THAT HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO SECURE AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PALESTINE. HENCE THE LANGUAGE EVENTUALLY AGREED. BAKER NOTED THAT DE MICHELIS HAD SAID THAT THE COMMUNITY WOULD NEGOTIATE A STATEMENT ON IRAQ WITH THE SOVIET UNION. WE SHOULD WATCH OUT FOR THE SOVIET UNION RETURNING TO THE CHARGE.
4. BAKER SAID THE UNITED STATES DID NOT RULE OUT AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. WITH THE COALITION OF ARAB STATES THAT HAD BEEN PUT TOGETHER, THERE MIGHT BE BETTER PROSPECTS FOR THE PEACE PROCESS AND FOR WORKING WITH ISRAEL ONCE SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS OUT OF KUWAIT. THE SECRETARY OF STATE COMMENTED THAT THIS STILL LEFT THE PROBLEM OF FINDING PALESTINIANS TO TALK TO. BAKER SAID THAT IF SYRIA, EGYPT AND THE GULF STATES WERE WORKING TOGETHER, THEY WOULD HAVE A BETTER CHANCE OF FINDING A DIALOGUE PARTNER OR PARTNERS. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD BEEN THE PROBLEM BEFORE: THE EXISTENCE OF THE COALITION COULD PUT USEFUL PRESSURE ON THE ISRAELIS. THE COALITION MIGHT ALSO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE PALESTINIANS. BAKER AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED THAT THE LGULF ARABS WERE FED UP WITH THE PALESTINIANS. BAKER SAID THAT MUBARAK HAD PUBLICLY DRAWN A DISTINCTION BETWEEN ARAFAT ON THE ONE HAND AND THE PALESTINIANS ON THE OTHER.

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED ABOUT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PRINCE 3 SULTAN'S STATEMENT ON AN ATTACK ON SADDAM HUSSEIN NOT BEING LAUNCHED FROM SAUDI TERRITORY. BAKER, LIKE THE SECRETARY OF STATE, HAD FOUND SAUDI ATTITUDES VERY DIFFERENT IN PRIVATE. THE SAUDIS, SAID BAKER, HAD BEEN WILLING TO HOLD THE AMERICANS' COATS FOR THE LAST 4 WEEKS. THEY WERE VERY EAGER FOR ACTION AND DID NOT WANT A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION. WHEN KING FAHD TALKED ABOUT THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, WHAT HE WANTED WAS A RESOLUTION TO LIBERATE KUWAIT UNDER ARTICLE 42. THE SAUDIS HAD BEEN ASKING FOR THAT SINCE THE MIDDLE OF AUGUST WHEN THE AMERICANS HAD TOLD THEM THAT THE CHANCES OF SECURING SUCH A RESOLUTION WERE BETWEEN SLIM AND NONE. BUT THE SAUDIS' FIRST CHOICE REMAINED ARTICLE 42, WITH ARTICLE 51 AS SECOND CHOICE. IF THERE WERE PROVOCATION BY SADDAM HUSSEIN, THEN THE SAUDIS THOUGHT THAT THE RESPONSE SHOULD NOT BE A MEASURED ONE. THEY WOULD WANT HIM HIT HARD. THEY DID NOT WANT HIM TO SURVIVE.

6. BAKER SPOKE WITH APPRECIATION OF THE DOLLARS TWELVE BILLION WHICH THE SAUDIS HAD PROMISED TO CONTRIBUTE TO US COSTS BETWEEN NOW AND THE END OF THE YEAR. BAKER WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE AMERICANS REALLY APPRECIATED WHAT BRITAIN HAD DONE AND THE FURTHER WE WERE WILLING TO CONSIDER. THE QUESTION OF GROUND FORCES WOULD BECOME AN ISSUE WITH CONGRESS. PUBLIC SUPPORT, WHICH HAD BEEN GREATER THAN THE ADMINISTRATION HAD HOPED, COULD BE MAINTAINED IF:

- 1) THE NATO ALLIES COULD PROVIDE GROUND FORCES:
- 2) THERE COULD BE MORE OF A CONTRIBUTION FROM THE FRG IN TERMS OF FINANCE, SEA LIFT CAPABILITY AND TANK TRANSPORT (THE LATTER BEING PARTICULARLY NECESSARY TO GET IN THE EGYPTIAN CONTINGENTS):
- 3) A BETTER PERFORMANCE BY JAPAN.

7. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID WE WOULD CERTAINLY DO MORE OURSELVES AND THE EXACT METHOD WAS BEING URGENTLY DISCUSSED. THE SECRETARY OF STATE DESCRIBED HIS MEETINGS IN JAPAN AND HOW HE HAD URGED THE JAPANESE TO DO MORE UNDER THE THREE HEADINGS: HELP FOR THE MULTINATIONAL FORCES, HELP FOR THE EVACUEES AND HELP FOR THE COUNTRIES WHICH WERE SUFFERING BECAUSE OF SANCTIONS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD NOT BEEN PERSUADED BY MUCH OF WHAT KAIFU HAD SAID BUT KAIFU WOULD BE GOING TO THE AREA IN OCTOBER AND HE THOUGHT THE JAPANESE WOULD OFFER MORE UNDER THE THREE HEADINGS. HE DOUBTED IF THEY WOULD SEND SHIPS. THE BEST APPROACH WAS NOT TO SHOUT AT THE JAPANESE, SINCE THAT PRODUCED ANTI BODIES, BUT TO KEEP UP PERSISTENT PRESSURE. HIS OWN ASSESSMENT WAS THAT KAIFU WAS A DOVE. THE FOREIGN MINISTER WAS HELPFUL AND THAT SOME OF THE PARTY BIG-WIGS MIGHT BE HELPFUL. ZOELLICK SAID THAT HASHIMOTO WAS THE REAL STUMBLING BLOCK. SINCE HE WAS PART OF THE TAKESHITA FACTION, IT MIGHT BE WORTH HAVING A GO AT TAKESHITA. BAKER SAID THAT HE MIGHT GET THE PRESIDENT TO WEIGH IN. IF THE JAPANESE DID NOT DO MORE, THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD GET UNSHIRTED HELL IN CONGRESS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE JAPANESE WERE WELL AWARE THAT THEIR STANDING IN THE UNITED STATES DEPENDED ON THEIR CONTRIBUTION IN THIS CRISIS. THAT WOULD HELP ERODE HASHIMOTO'S POSITION.

8. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE WERE VERY CONTENT WITH THE COOPERATION WE HAD WITH THE AMERICANS IN THE GULF. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO FEEL THAT WE WERE PRIVY TO AMERICAN THINKING. BAKER SAID THE SECRETARY OF STATE WAS PRIVY TO EVERYTHING HE HAD BEEN THINKING ABOUT. HIS MIND WAS NOW TURNING TO THE ISSUE OF NON PROLIFERATION IN RESPECT OF IRAQ. IF SADDAM HUSSEIN WERE REMOVED FROM KUWAIT WITHOUT A WAR, THEN THERE NEEDED TO BE A MASSIVE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT. WE SHOULD THINK ABOUT A CONTINUING INTERNATIONAL ARMS EMBARGO TO PREVENT SADDAM HUSSEIN'S WAR MACHINE FROM REVIVING. THE ADMINISTRATION WERE CONFIDENT ABOUT THEIR ABILITY TO PROTECT THE GULF. THEY DID NOT, HOWEVER, HAVE ENOUGH FORCES ON THE GROUND TO MOVE INTO KUWAIT. IT WOULD BE ABOUT SIX WEEKS BEFORE THEY WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO MOVE INTO KUWAIT. AT THAT STAGE, CAREFUL STOCK SHOULD BE TAKEN OF WHETHER TO TAKE ACTION. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THERE WAS SUFFICIENT INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT WOULD BE A SIGNIFICANT ONE. ONE POINT BAKER HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY REPORTED FROM THE HELSINKI SUMMIT WAS THAT AKROMEYEV HAD TOLD THE AMERICANS THAT THE IRAQI TROOPS WERE GOOD AND THAT THERE WOULD BE MAJOR CASUALTIES IN ANY CONFRONTATION. THE IRAQIS WERE SOVIET TRAINED. THE AMERICANS DISCOUNTED THAT VIEW TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY DID NOT BELIEVE THE IRAQIS TO BE THAT GOOD BUT THEY DID AGREE WITH THE RUSSIANS THAT, IN THE EVENT OF CONFLICT, THERE WOULD BE MAJOR CASUALTIES. WHEN WE GOT TO THE POINT OF DECISION ON THE NEXT STEP, WE SHOULD NOT REJECT THE IDEA OF AN ARTICLE 42 RESOLUTION BUT WE SHOULD NOT GO DOWN THAT ROUTE UNLESS WE WERE CERTAIN FROM PRIVATE CONSULTATIONS THAT WE HAD THE SUPPORT FROM THE FIVE. GIVEN THE WAY THINGS HAD GONE SO FAR, HE DID NOT BELIEVE IT WAS A FOREGONE CONCLUSION THAT AN ARTICLE 42 RESOLUTION WAS UNATTAINABLE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED ON THE ADVANTAGES OF AN ARTICLE 42 RESOLUTION SUBJECT TO THE PROVISOS BAKER HAD MENTIONED. WE MUST NOT ALLOW OUR FREEDOM OF ACTION TO BE CURTAILED HOWEVER. BAKER AGREED. ARTICLE 42 ALSO RAISED THE PROBLEM OF A UN COMMAND, WHICH THE SOVIETS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY ASK FOR.

9. LATER IN THE MEETING, WHEN BAKER LEARNED THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE WAS TO HAVE DINNER WITH GENSCHER, HE ASKED THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO URGE ON HIM THE NEED FOR STRONG GERMAN SUPPORT IN THIS FIRST CRISIS OF THE POST-COLD WAR ERA. THE GERMANS HAD COME UP WITH A SEA AND AIR-LIFT CAPACITY BUT SAID THEY COULD NOT PROVIDE MILITARY ASSISTANCE. THE US DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE GERMAN CONSTITUTION DEBARRED A CONTRIBUTION. KOHL WAS STRONG ON THIS ISSUE BUT GENSCHER WAS WEAK AND NEGATIVE. WE SHOULD LET GENSCHER KNOW THAT WE HAD SUPPORTED HIM ON UNIFICATION. THIS ISSUE WAS OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE TO THE REST OF THE ALLIES AND SHOULD BE TO THE GERMANS AS WELL. ZOELLICK COMMENTED THAT THE GERMANS WOULD HAVE TO FACE UP TO MORE OF THESE ISSUES IN FUTURE. WHAT BETTER PLACE TO START THAN THIS ONE, WHERE THERE WAS SUCH A STRONG INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS?

10. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT GENSCHER HAD SUCH A FERTILE AND INGENIOUS MIND THAT HE (AND DE MICHELIS) MIGHT WELL START TO LOOK FOR SOME GERMAN/EUROPEAN WAY OF SETTLING THIS ISSUE WHICH FELL SHORT OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. WE WOULD HAVE TO BE VIGILANT.

11. BAKER DESCRIBED HIS MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK IN ALEXANDRIA. MUBARAK BELIEVED THAT THE WHOLE CONCEPT OF THE ARAB COOPERATION COUNCIL HAD BEEN GEARED TO SADDAM HUSSEIN'S PLANS TO INVADE KUWAIT. SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD LOBBIED MUBARAK HARD TO JOIN. MUBARAK THOUGHT IT INCONCEIVABLE THAT KING HUSSEIN HAD NOT HAD SOME KNOWLEDGE OF SADDAM HUSSEIN'S PLANS. KING HUSSEIN HAD SENT MUBARAK DOLLARS FIFTY MILLION FOR THE POOR PEOPLE OF EGYPT. MUBARAK HAD EXPRESSED ANAZEMENT. WHAT WAS THIS FOR, GIVEN THAT THERE WERE MANY MORE POOR PEOPLE IN IRAQ THAN IN EGYPT? SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD, BEFORE THE INVASION, ALSO SENT 3 ROLLS ROYCES, ONE TO MUBARAK, ONE TO KING HUSSEIN AND ONE TO PRESIDENT SALEH OF YEMEN. ONLY MUBARAK HAD SENT HIS BACK.

12. THE SECRETARY OF STATE DESCRIBED HIS MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN IN JORDAN. THE KING WAS UNDOUBTEDLY SHAKEN BUT WAS STILL EQUIVOCATING. BAKER SAID THAT JORDAN WAS SAYING THE RIGHT THINGS ON SANCTIONS AND WAS BEGINNING TO MAKE BETTER EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT THEM. BAKER, DURING HIS OWN VISIT TO THE GULF, HAD NOT THOUGHT IT POLITIC TO MENTION JORDAN'S PLIGHT TO THE KUWAITIS, SAUDIS OR THE UAE BUT JORDAN WAS ON THE JAPANESE AND COMMUNITY LIST AS A COUNTRY TO BE HELPED. BAKER AGREED WITH US THAT ANY FORESEEABLE ALTERNATIVE TO KING HUSSEIN WOULD BE WORSE. OTHER ARAB LEADERS BAKER HAD SPOKEN TO HAD STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT GIVING KING HUSSEIN AN AMBIGUOUS MESSAGE.

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE THOUGHT THAT THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, KASIH WAS FED UP WITH THE WAY JORDANIAN POLICY WAS BEING CONDUCTED. BAKER WAS NOT SO SURE. HE THOUGHT HE WAS ONE OF THOSE WHO HAD BEEN MOST IN FAVOUR OF JORDANIAN LINKS WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN. BEN SHAKER HAD BEEN MUCH MORE CRITICAL AT AN EARLY STAGE.

14. BAKER SAID THAT AFTER MOSCOW HE WOULD BE GOING TO SYRIA, ITALY AND GERMANY. DE MICHELIS HAD SAID THAT ITALY WOULD LOOK AT THE POSSIBILITY OF PROVIDING SOME AIR SUPPORT.

BRAITHWAITE