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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY  
SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETINGS WITH AMIR AND HEIR APPARENT OF  
QATAR

## SUMMARY

1. QATARIS GRATEFUL FOR SWIFT RESPONSE OF US AND UK AND PARTICULARLY ROLE PLAYED BY PRIME MINISTER. HURT BY KING HUSSEIN'S POSITION. GRATEFUL FOR UK OFFER OF MILITARY SUPPORT:- UK LIAISON OFFICER TO DISCUSS DETAIL.

## DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD MEETINGS ON 1 SEPTEMBER WITH THE AMIR OF QATAR AND WITH THE HEIR APPARENT. THE AMIR STRESSED HIS GRATITUDE TO THE PRIME MINISTER FOR THE ROLE SHE HAD PLAYED IN ACHIEVING SUCH A SWIFT RESPONSE BY BOTH THE US AND THE UK TO THE INVASION OF KUWAIT. THE PRIME MINISTER WAS THE CATALYST FOR THE ROBUST US REACTION.

3. THE AMIR SAID THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN'S PLAN FOR THE CAPTURE OF KUWAIT HAD BEEN A FIASCO. HE HAD INTENDED TO ELIMINATE THE EMIR AND CROWN PRINCE OF KUWAIT: TO PERSUADE THE OPPOSITION TO COOPERATE: AND TO GRAB KUWAITI ASSETS. HE HAD FAILED IN EACH OF THESE. IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO JUDGE WHAT HE MIGHT DO NEXT. THE BLOCKADE PROMISED TO BE EFFECTIVE, IF SO, IT COULD CAUSE AN INTERNAL ERUPTION IN IRAQ. TO BE SUCCESSFUL, ANY ATTEMPT TO TOPPLE SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD NEED THE COOPERATION OF THE REPUBLICAN GUARD. BUT IF THE BLOCKADE DID NOT WORK, EVERYONE WOULD UNDERSTAND THE NEED FOR MILITARY ACTION. THE BLOCKADE SHOULD ALSO EXTEND TO SUPPLIES REACHING IRAQ BY AIR FROM LIBYA, YEMEN AND SUDAN.

4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID OUR ANALYSIS WAS SIMILAR. THE BEST WAY TO ACHIEVE OUR COMMON GOAL WAS TO MAKE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WORK. THEY WOULD BE EFFECTIVE AT SEA AND OIL COULD NOT BE EXPORTED BY AIR. NEVERTHELESS, WE WERE CONSIDERING HOW TO PERSUADE COUNTRIES TO PREVENT AN EFFECTIVE AIRLIFT TO IRAQ.

5. THE AMIR SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN WOUNDED BY THE POSITION TAKEN BY KING HUSSEIN. HE WAS AN OLD FRIEND. THE AMIR AGREED THAT JORDAN WOULD DESERVE OUR SUPPORT BUT ONLY IF SHE CHANGED HER

POLICY TOWARDS IRAQ. ARAB LEAGUE FOREIGN MINISTERS HAD YESTERDAY AGREED A RESOLUTION THAT AN ARAB SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM COULD ONLY BE ARRIVED AT THROUGH THE ARAB LEAGUE. THIS WAS INTENDED TO ALLEVIATE IRAQI PRESSURE ON KING HUSSEIN TO MEDIATE.

6. THE AMIR EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT THAT YEMEN HAD TAKEN A PRO-IRAQI POSITION. THE PRESIDENT, ALI ABDULLAH SALEH, WAS COOPERATIVE, BUT A NUMBER OF SENIOR OFFICERS IN THE ARMED FORCES OWED ALLEGIANCE TO IRAQ BECAUSE THEY HAD TRAINED THERE AND BEEN SUPPORTED FINANCIALLY BY SADDAM HUSSEIN. THE HEIR APPARENT SAID THAT QATAR INTENDED TO SEND AN EMISSARY TO SANA'A SHORTLY AND HOPED THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE WOULD GIVE THE QATARIS AN ACCOUNT OF HIS VISIT. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED.

7. BOTH THE AMIR AND THE HEIR APPARENT WERE ADAMANT THAT THE LEADERS OF THE PLO WERE NOW DETESTED BY ALL ARABS. ARAFAT WAS PERSONA NON GRATA IN THE GULF. THE AMIR SAID THAT A SOLUTION TO THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM SHOULD BE ARRIVED AT THROUGH THE UN AND THE ARAB LEAGUE. THE HEIR APPARENT ADDED THAT IF IN FUTURE THE US SUPPORTED ISRAEL AGAINST THE PALESTINIANS, THE GCC COUNTRIES SHOULD NOT UNRESERVEDLY TAKE THE SIDE OF THE PALESTINIANS, NOR FORGET THAT THE US HAD HELPED THEM IN THEIR TIME OF NEED.

8. ON THE FUTURE OF THE GULF, THE HEIR APPARENT WAS CRITICAL OF THE LACK OF COORDINATION BETWEEN GCC COUNTRIES. THIS HAD BEEN CRUELLY EXPOSED BY THE INVASION OF KUWAIT, WHEN IT HAD TAKEN 3 DAYS EVEN TO ISSUE A STATEMENT. THE PENINSULA SHIELD FORCE OF THE GCC HAD BEEN PROVEN TO BE INEFFECTIVE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT SOME GULF STATES HAD SUBSTANTIAL AND WELL-EQUIPPED ARMED FORCES. THE GCC HAD BEEN PARALYSED BY THE INVASION. THIS WOULD HAVE TO CHANGE AND THE HEIR APPARENT HOPED THAT WE WOULD PRESS THE GULF STATES TO IMPROVE THEIR STANDARDS OF ADMINISTRATION AND THEIR POLITICAL AND MILITARY DECISION-MAKING.

9. THE HEIR APPARENT SAID THAT SOME GULF STATES - NOTABLY BAHRAIN AND THE EMIRATES, WERE STILL FRIGHTENED. WE NEEDED TO FIGHT SADDAM HUSSEIN'S MEDIA CAMPAIGN, WHICH WAS THE ONLY EFFECTIVE WEAPON LEFT TO HIM. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED AND OFFERED TO PROVIDE MATERIAL AND ADVICE TO QATAR.

10. THE HEIR APPARENT SAID THAT ONCE THE CRISIS WAS PAST, SAUDI ARABIA WOULD ASK FOREIGN TROOPS TO LEAVE. ALREADY THERE WAS CRITICISM OF SAUDI ARABIA FOR INVITING FOREIGN TROOPS, PARTICULARLY GIVEN THAT SAUDI ARABIA SPENT THREE TIMES AS MUCH ON ITS ARMED FORCES AS IRAQ. SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS PLAYING TO THE ISLAMIC GALLERY BY SPEAKING OF THE DEFILEMENT OF THE HOLY PLACES BY FOREIGN FORCES. NEVERTHELESS, THE SAUDIS WOULD ENCOURAGE THEIR NEIGHBOURS TO KEEP FOREIGN FORCES ON THEIR SOIL - THE HEIR APPARENT IMPLIED THAT QATAR WOULD BE WILLING TO DO SO. FOR THE

PRESENT, THE HEIR APPARENT BELIEVED THAT THE AL-SAUD WERE UNITED BEHIND KING FAHD. BUT THE SAUDIS NEEDED TO REALISE THAT LEADERSHIP WAS NOT JUST ABOUT BUILDING INFRASTRUCTURE - GREATER EMPHASIS ON SPIRITUAL AND INTELLECTUAL QUALITIES WAS NEEDED.

11. THE HEIR APPARENT SAID THAT AFTER THE IRAQIS HAD BEEN PERSUADED TO WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT, AND THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT WAS RESTORED, THERE SHOULD BE A RETURN TO AN ELECTED PARLIAMENT. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF SUCH PLANS NOW WOULD HELP WITH US PUBLIC OPINION WHICH DID NOT ALWAYS UNDERSTAND THE NATURE OF THE GULF MONARCHIES. THE HEIR APPARENT URGED THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO SAY THIS TO THE EMIR OF KUWAIT.  
MILITARY ASSISTANCE

12. THE SECRETARY OF STATE DESCRIBED BRIEFLY TO THE AMIR, AND MORE FULLY TO THE HEIR APPARENT, THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE WE WERE PREPARED TO OFFER (YOUR TELNO 131 TO DOHA). BOTH WERE GRATEFUL. THE HEIR APPARENT SUGGESTED WE APPOINT A LIAISON OFFICER TO DISCUSS THE DETAILS WITH THE QATARI CHIEF OF STAFF. QATAR PARTICULARLY NEEDED HELP IN ENSURING ALL PROPER PRECAUTIONS WERE TAKEN FOR THE PROTECTION OF OFF-SHORE OIL INSTALLATIONS AGAINST MILITARY ATTACK. BUT, ALTHOUGH HE WELCOMED THE OFFER OF COUNTER-TERRORISM TRAINING, THE HEIR APPARENT EMPHASISED THAT THERE WAS NO INTERNAL THREAT TO THE QATARI GOVERNMENT. HE DID NOT (NOT) WANT US TO REFER TO COUNTER-TERRORIST TRAINING PUBLICLY. HE BELIEVED THAT IF IRAQ HAD A CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT SABOTAGE OPERATIONS, THEY WOULD ALREADY HAVE DONE SO. THERE WAS NO PROBLEM WITH THE STAGING OF ANY NUMBER OF AEROPLANES THROUGH DOHA.  
ECONOMIC

13. THE AMIR MENTIONED THAT JAPANESE COMPANIES HAD BROKEN OFF NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE SUPPLY OF LNG BECAUSE OF THE CRISIS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE WOULD ENCOURAGE THE JAPANESE TO BE LESS TIMID WHEN HE VISITED TOKYO LATER THIS MONTH. HE HOPED THAT THE AMIR WOULD ENCOURAGE BP WHO WERE ANXIOUS TO PLAY A ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF QATAR'S NEW GASFIELD.

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