CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON

TO DESKBY 230100Z FC0

TELNO 2014

OF 222359Z AUGUST 90

INFO DESKBY 230100Z UK

ADVANCE COPY

INFO DESKBY 230100Z UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW, SANA'A, BAGHDAD, PARIS, ESC LONDON, ACTOR

MIPT: IRAQ/KUWAIT: IRAQI TANKERS

- 1. KIMMITT TOLD ME THAT IN ADDITION TO THE FIVE IRAQI TANKERS CURRENTLY IN OMANI WATERS (WHICH WOULD BE ENTERING YEMENI WATERS IN THE NEXT 12-24 HOURS), A FURTHER IRAQI TANKER THE AIN ZALAH (MY TELNO 1997) WHICH HAD EARLIER DOCKED IN ADEN, HAD NOW DISCHARGED ITS CARGO OF IRAQI CRUDE. THIS WAS OF CONCERN, AND MIGHT BE AN EXAMPLE OF SANCTIONS BUSTING, IN US EYES AT LEAST, THOUGH THE RUSSIANS MIGHT DISPUTE IT.
- 2. KIMMITT SAID IN THIS CONTEXT THAT SHEVARDNADZE HAD ASKED BAKER IF THE US HAD EVIDENCE OF IRAQI CIRCUMVENTION OF SANCTIONS WHICH MIGHT HAVE BEEN PREVENTED HAD ACTIVE MILITARY MEASURES BEEN TAKEN. SHEVARDNADZE HAD ARGUED THAT A TANKER MOORED AT ADEN WHICH DID NOT UNLOAD ITS CARGO MIGHT NOT TECHNICALLY BE A BREACH OF SANCTIONS (KIMMITT ADDED AS A GLOSS THAT BAKER HAD INTERPRETED THIS AS SHEVARDNADZE POSSIBLY SEEKING QUOTE A HOOK UNQUOTE ON WHICH TO HANG AN INTERDICTION RESOLUTION). THE US WERE THEREFORE LOOKING FOR FACTS - IN ESSENCE QUOTE A SMOKING GUN UNQUOTE - WITH WHICH THEY COULD GO BACK TO THE RUSSIANS AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE US WERE SEEKING DATA AND ASKED IF WE OR THE FRENCH COULD CONTRIBUTE. I GAVE BOLTON (ASSISTANT SECRETARY, INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AFFAIRS), WHO ATTENDED THE MEETING, YOUR TELNO 474, AND SAID THAT WE WOULD BE CO-ORDINATING WITH THE US MISSION IN NEW YORK ABOUT PUTTING THIS INFORMATION BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL. KIMMITT MADE IT CLEAR THE AMERICANS HAD PARALLEL INFORMATION. THEY WOULD BE SUGGESTING TO THE EGYPTIANS IT WOULD BE RIGHT TO HOLD UP THE BALQUEES FOR PROLONGED INSPECTION.
- 3. ON AN OPERATIONAL POINT, KIMMITT NOTED THAT IRAQI TACTICS WERE TO STAY WITHIN TERRITORIAL WATERS FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE, PASSING DIRECTLY FROM OMANI TO YEMENI WATERS. THE US HAD ASKED THE OMANIS EITHER TO STOP THE TANKERS THEMSELVES OR TO LET THE US ENTER THEIR WATERS TO DO SO. THE OMANIS HAD AGREED TO THE LATTER AND WOULD NO DOUBT EXTEND THAT AGREEMENT TO BRITISH AND FRENCH WARSHIPS. THE US COULD ALSO APPROACH THE YEMENIS FOR SIMILAR RIGHTS ON 25 AUGUST.

PAGE 1 CONFIDENTIAL WOOD

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

35

ADVANCE 3532

IRAQ/KUWAIT PS PS/MR WALDEGRAVE PS/PUS MR TOMKYS MR GORE-BOOTH MR FAIRWEATHER MR GOULDEN MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS) HD/MED HD/NENAD HD/NAD HD/SED HD/UND HD/CONSULAR D HD/NEWS D HD/NPDD HD/SECPOL D

MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY MR APPLEYARD CABINET OFFICE (BY TUBE H29) MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE (BY TUBE H29) MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE (BY TUBE H29) MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE (BY TUBE H29) PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST SIR P CRADOCK, (NO 10 DOWNING ST) CABINET OFFICE DIO (BY TUBE H29) SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE AUS (C) MODUK HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND EMERGENCY UNIT RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN

HD/AMD

HD/ECD(E)

PAGE 2 CONFIDENTIAL