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INFO IMMEDIATE GULF POSTS, EC POSTS, MOSCOW, BAGHDAD

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

IRAQ/KUWAIT: SECRETARY OF STATE'S TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
SECRETARY BAKER

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE TELEPHONED BAKER THIS EVENING AFTER THE WEU AND EPC MINISTERIAL MEETINGS IN PARIS.
2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE WEU MEETING HAD GONE WELL. IT WAS RATHER LIKE A PLEDGING CONFERENCE WHICH HAD ALSO SET IN HAND COORDINATION OF FORCES ON THE SPOT. WE WOULD NEED TO BE IN TOUCH WITH THE AMERICANS ON HOW TO TAKE THIS COORDINATION FURTHER FORWARD. BUT IT APPEARED THAT ALL THE WEU MEMBERS AGREED THAT AT SOME POINT WE WOULD NEED TO TAKE ACTION TO ENFORCE THE EMBARGO. THE DIFFERENCE LAY BETWEEN THOSE (THE UK AND FRANCE) WHO THOUGHT THAT THE USE OF FORCE WAS PERMITTED BY VIRTUE OF ARTICLE 51 AND THE REQUEST FROM THE KUWAITI GOVERNMENT, AND THOSE WHO BELIEVED THAT A FURTHER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WAS NEEDED. THE FRENCH WERE QUITE CLEAR THAT SHIPS COULD BE USED FOR QUOTE CONSTRAINT UNQUOTE.
3. BAKER SAID THAT A FURTHER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WOULD BE PREFERABLE AND THE US WOULD KEEP PRESSING FOR IT. HE HOPED THAT THIS MIGHT BE DONE WITHIN THE NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS, ALTHOUGH THE TANKER WHICH HAD ORIGINALLY BEEN THE CAUSE FOR FORCING THE PACE WAS NOW NO LONGER A PROBLEM. BUT THE US NAVY WAS SHADOWING ANOTHER TANKER AND HE EXPECTED TO RECEIVE, IN A FEW HOURS, A READ-OUT ON WHEN THE CRITICAL POINT FOR STOPPING THAT TANKER WOULD BE REACHED. THE US APPRECIATED THE NEED TO KEEP WORKING CAREFULLY WITH THE RUSSIANS. THE US WANTED TO KEEP A SOLID FRONT.
4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE GAVE MR BAKER AN ACCOUNT OF HIS CONVERSATION WITH ZAMYATIN, WHO HAD CLAIMED THAT THE PROBLEM IN NEW YORK LAY WITH THE CHINESE AND NON-ALIGNED.
5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE THEN GAVE BAKER A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE EPC MINISTERIAL MEETING IN PARIS WHICH HAD LARGELY FOCUSED ON THE FUTURE OF OUR EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT AFTER 24 AUGUST. THE UNANIMOUS VIEW HAD BEEN THAT WE SHOULD ASK OUR STAFF THERE TO

REMAIN UNTIL, PHYSICALLY AND PRACTICALLY, THEY COULD NO LONGER DO SO. WE MUST SHOW THE MAXIMUM SOLIDARITY WITH OUR CITIZENS. WE DID NOT UNDER-ESTIMATE THE RISK INVOLVED FOR THOSE WHO STAYED BEHIND. THIS MADE IT PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT WE ALL STAY IN LINE.

6. BAKER SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE US POSITION WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY COME OUT THE SAME. A DECISION WAS AWAITING THE PRESIDENT'S APPROVAL THAT THE EMBASSY IN KUWAIT WOULD NOT CLOSE DOWN ON 24 AUGUST - THE IRAQIS HAD NO RIGHT TO INSIST. BUT THE US MIGHT REDUCE THE NUMBERS OF ITS STAFF TO THE MINIMUM NEEDED TO KEEP CONTACT WITH US CITIZENS. HE AGREED THAT HE WOULD LET US KNOW IF IT LOOKED AS THOUGH THAT DECISION WOULD BE CHANGED.

7. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT ONE ADDITIONAL ELEMENT IN THE EPC DECLARATION WAS THE LINE THAT INDIVIDUAL IRAQIS WHO COMMITTED ILLEGAL ACTS AGAINST FOREIGN NATIONALS WOULD BE HELD PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR MISDEEDS. EC MINISTERS THOUGHT THIS WOULD HAVE A SALUTARY EFFECT. BAKER THOUGHT THIS AN EXCELLENT IDEA AND ASKED IF THE SECRETARY OF STATE WOULD ARRANGE FOR THE LANGUAGE WHICH MINISTERS HAD USED TO BE SENT TO HIM.

8. FINALLY, BAKER SAID THAT WE SHOULD CONSIDER WHAT WE MIGHT DO WITH REGARD TO IRAQI REPRESENTATION IN OUR COUNTRIES. HE HAD NOTHING IN PARTICULAR IN MIND. BUT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO ACT IN CONCERT. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED THAT WE MUST LOOK AT IT, ALTHOUGH HE SAW A DANGER THAT WE COULD GET INTO A TIT FOR TAT EXCHANGE WHICH WOULD LEAVE US WITH NO-ONE IN BAGHDAD.

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