CONFIDENTIAL FM DOHA TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 137 OF 161330Z AUGUST 90 INFO IMMEDIATE ABU DHABI, BAHRAIN, MODUK, ACTOR

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Prime Minister

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BAHRAIN, MODUK, ACTOR going.

VISIT OF MINISTER FOR DEFENCE PROCUREMENT: 15-16 AUGUST

INFO PRIORITY RIYADH, BAGHDAD, KUWAIT

SUMMARY

1. OBJECTIVES ACHIEVED. MUCH REASSURED BY MINISTER'S VISIT AS PERSONAL EMISSARY. AMIR RESPONDS FAVOURABLY TO PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER. NO SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE. CONTENT TO LET UK FORCES USE QATARI FACILITIES.

DETAIL

- 2. HON ALAN CLARK, MINISTER FOR DEFENCE PROCUREMENT ACCOMPANIED BY VCDS, GENERAL SIR RICHARD VINCENT, 5 OFFICIALS AND 5 FROM THE UK MEDIA VISITED QATAR BRIEFLY FOR 24 HOURS FOR TALKS WITH THE AMIR, THE HEIR APPARENT AND QATAR MINISTRY OF DEFENCE OFFICIALS.
- 3. THE AMIR WAS IN AN EBULLIENT MOOD. HE WAS FULL OF PRAISE AND APPRECIATION OF ''HIS VERY CLOSE FRIEND'' THE PRIME MINISTER AND WAS HIGHLY PLEASED WUTH THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER OF 8 AUGUST. MR CLARK WAS HANDED A SEALED WRITTEN REPLY LATER IN THE DAY. THE AMIR SAID HE PROPOSED TO VISIT LONDON IN THE WINTER AND DISCUSS THE CRISIS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER.
- 4. THE AMIR WAS HIGHLY CRITICAL (''ASHAMED'') OF SOME OF HIS ARAB NEIGHBOURS AT THE ARAB SUMMIT AND TOTALLY CONDEMNED SADDAM HUSSEIN (CALLING HIM A FOX, LIAR AND A KILLER). HE MADE VERY PLAIN THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO RESTORE THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE KUWAIT GOVERNMENT. HE ALSO REQUESTED OUR HELP IN MAINTAINING A TOTAL BLOCKADE ON IRAQ AND TO STOP POTENTIAL LEAKAGE THROUGH IRAN. HE MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT SADDAM COULD NOT BE TRUSTED.
- 5. THE AMIR DID NOT WANT TO DISCUSS ANY DETAILS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE. HE SUGGESTED THAT THIS BE FOLLOWED UP LATER. HE DID HOWEVER OFFER QATAR FACILITIES FOR OUR SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT.

PAGE CONFIDENTIAL IN RETURN THE AMIR OFFERED INFORMATION ON POSSIBLE TERRORIST ACTIVITY (PALESTINIAN AND JORDANIAN) IN THE AREA.

6. THE FOLLOWING MEETING WITH THE CHIEF OF STAFF WAS LESS SUCCESSFUL (PROBABLY A FEATURE ODF THE COS' PERSONALITY) AND THE MAJORITY OF THE DISCUSSION COVERED THE GENERAL SITUATION. HE HAD NO SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR HELP. THEIR FEARS ABOUT CW HAD DIMINISHED FOLLOWING RECENT TECHNICAL BRIEFING. HE SHOWED LITTLE ENTHUSIASM FOR THE STAGING OF BRITISH AIRCRAFT IN DOHA - MAINLY FOR LOGISTICAL REASONS.

COMMENT

7. THE AMIR WAS VERY FLATTERED BY THE PRIME MINISTER'S CONCERN AND WELCOMED OUR FIRM INTEREST. THIS HAS GONE DOWN VERY WELL AND HAS SET THE SCENE ADMIRABLY FOR THE FOREIGN SECRETARY'S PROPOSED VISIT ON 1 SEPTEMBER. HE SAID HE HAD MADE SOME CAUSTIC REMARKS ABOUT THE FRENCH ''BEING TOO LATE'' TO THE FRENCH ENVOY WHO VISITED ON 14 AUGUST WITH A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT MITTERAND. MR CLARK WILL REPORT IN FULLER DETAILS OF THE VISIT ON HIS RETURN.

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