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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister ² 16 August 1990

Dear Dominic,

To see. Van den Broek said much the same on Radio 4 this morning. He & the Dutch in ^{General have been the most helpful of the other} ~~Foreign Secretary's telephone conversation with the~~ EC countries Dutch Foreign Minister

Mr Van den Broek telephoned the Foreign Secretary this evening to discuss the WEU meeting in Paris on Tuesday to discuss the Gulf crisis. The Foreign Secretary believes that the Prime Minister may be interested in an account of their conversation. DM

Mr Van den Broek raised the question of participation at the WEU meeting. The French were pressing for attendance as observers by EC members who were not members of the WEU. Mr Van den Broek understood that we and the Germans took the view that to exclude the Turks from attending in these circumstances would be unacceptable. Could we then agree that a meeting should be restricted solely to WEU members? The Foreign Secretary said that we could accept either this solution or attendance by observers, but including the Turks.

There was then some discussion of what the WEU should seek to achieve. Mr Van den Broek said that what was needed was a firm commitment on coordination of the forces of WEU member states going to the Gulf. For the Belgians, in particular, this was essential. The Italians and Germans, as well as the Dutch, also thought this important. We therefore needed a formula which blessed the best possible coordination. The Foreign Secretary agreed.

Mr Van den Broek continued that, in the light of recent developments, it might also be necessary for the Security Council to take another look at the implementation, and if necessary enforcement, of sanctions. This was not to imply any criticism of the position which had been taken by the US and UK. But the French had been striking a different attitude in a way which did not augur well for future WEU cooperation. In addition, Mr Van den Broek thought that the Iraqis would be only too happy if the UK or US was obliged to enforce the embargo. This would fuel pro-Iraqi and anti-US sentiment. There would be advantage if the WEU could achieve a consensus on how to take forward action in the UN. Ideally, the Security Council would agree that use of force should not be excluded in order to enforce the sanctions.

The Foreign Secretary said that we did not believe that at the time of SCR 661 it would have been possible to specify a blockade in order to enforce sanctions but it was very

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important that they should be observed. While we had no objection in principle to further Security Council Resolutions, the worst thing would be to try and fail. It was not clear that the support would be present for a further Resolution now. Accordingly, we did not think that the WEU should push for a Resolution which was not available.

Mr Van den Broek said that he understood this, although a further Resolution would solve a great many problems.

I am copying this letter to Jane Binstead (MOD) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

ms
James Gass
[Signature]

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

Dominic Morris Esq
10 Downing Street

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*Prime Minister*²

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Foreign Secretary's telephone conversation with the Dutch Foreign Minister *EC countries*

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Private Secretary

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