



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 March 1988

John Gorton

Prime Minister's Visit to Poland

In your letter of 2 February, you set out the basis on which you wished us to discuss arrangements for this visit with the Polish authorities.

We have now had a response. I enclose Warsaw telnos 110 and 111. As you see, the Polish MFA have told our Charge d'Affaires, Mr Thorpe, that a visit to Gdansk is not acceptable, and that this decision is not negotiable. They have proposed a visit to Krakow (and Auschwitz) instead, and have made other suggestions for the programme. We have consulted Mr Barder, the Ambassador in Warsaw, who is in London this week. What follows reflects inter alia his views.

The categorical terms in which the Poles have rejected Gdansk suggest that, to stand any chance at all of moving them, we shall have to threaten to cancel the visit to Poland altogether, and hence must be ready to carry out that threat if they stand firm (as Mr Barder believes they will). In that event we should have forfeited, for the foreseeable future, all chance of using a visit by the Prime Minister to promote our objectives in Poland. The row with the Polish authorities would probably also diminish our chances of exerting our influence on events in other ways, for some time to come. The issue which now needs to be decided, in the Foreign Secretary's view, is therefore whether the Prime Minister should go ahead with a visit to Poland, if Gdansk is not included.

Our objectives for the visit were summarised in my letter of 27 July 1987. Briefly, they are that the Prime Minister should use her special authority to keep Poland moving in a more liberal political direction, including by showing support for Solidarity and having a meeting with Walesa; and to maintain pressure for economic reform. The Polish authorities have of course since agreed to a meeting with Walesa. As for political and economic reform, there has been little progress since the Polish referendum of last November, in which the authorities failed to get an absolute majority for their proposals. Several individuals have recently been arrested on arguably political grounds. Discussions with the IMF have made little progress.

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In these circumstances, a visit by the Prime Minister has become even more important, as a means of pressing for political and economic reform. There will be other opportunities for senior Western Ministers to do this. Chancellor Kohl for instance plans to visit Poland later this year (President Reagan has dropped his tentative plans for a visit). But the Prime Minister is better placed than anyone else in the West to encourage Jaruzelski to move, including on an agreement with the IMF.

Cancellation of the visit because Gdansk was not included would of course highlight the continuing importance to us of Solidarity. But you will see from para 6 of Warsaw telno 110 that the evidence is that Solidarity itself, as well as the Polish people generally, would prefer the Prime Minister to go ahead with her visit and meet Walesa, even if Gdansk is not included.

Against this background, the Foreign Secretary considers that it would on balance be right for the Prime Minister to go ahead with the visit. Mr Barder's recommendation, with which the Foreign Secretary agrees, is that we should agree to drop Gdansk, but make clear that this would be on the following conditions:

- (a) No visit to Krakow unless the Prime Minister is attracted by the idea of a visit to Auschwitz. Mr Barder does not share the Polish view, reflected in Warsaw telno 110, that it would be misunderstood if the Prime Minister failed to go to Auschwitz. Should the Prime Minister wish to go there, however, a meeting could be arranged in Krakow with two or three independent personalities. This would help to balance an otherwise exclusively official programme there. There is no prominent Solidarity personality whom the Prime Minister could meet in Krakow.
- (b) We should make clear that the Prime Minister would wish to use the extra time in Warsaw for a longer meeting over lunch with Walesa and Solidarity; and for a meeting with moderate independents.
- (c) No meeting with the Consultative Council, or with the Marshal of the Sejm, Malinowski. (Precedents for a meeting with the Consultative Council are not encouraging: the group which Genscher met in January included several Party members. A meeting with Malinowski would not be worthwhile either).
- (d) That the Prime Minister can agree to lay a wreath at the Nike Monument, but would not wish to unveil a plaque in the Skaryszewski Park. (You wrote to Andrews, MOD, about the latter proposal on 9 March. The Skaryszewski Park is in an inaccessible part of Warsaw and, for reasons which will be explained in a separate letter, neither we nor the MOD feel that the Prime Minister should agree to unveil a plaque there).



(e) That a visit to the Hala Mirowska market be reinstated, and no visit to the Royal Castle included (though we might say that the Prime Minister would be willing to view the Royal Castle from the outside, during a short visit to the old town).

/ I attach a revised outline programme, reflecting these proposals. Even without Gdansk it amounts to a difficult package for the Poles to accept and will afford the Prime Minister ample opportunities to ram home the message of our support for Solidarity and the cause of human rights in Poland. The Foreign Secretary believes we should make clear to the Poles that we are only prepared to accept the dropping of Gdansk on the basis that our wishes or other aspects of the programme are met (it is the Poles, not us, who are the real demandeurs over this visit).

If the Prime Minister is content that discussions should be pursued with the Polish authorities on this basis, I shall write separately about other aspects of the visit.

Sans over

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'L Parker'.

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

PS

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

(for NO 10)

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01355
MDHIAN 213

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WARSAW
TO DESKBY 161000Z FCO
TELNO 110
OF 151530Z MARCH 88

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO POLAND

SUMMARY

1. POLES REJECT PROPOSAL TO INCLUDE VISIT TO GDANSK IN PRIME MINISTER'S PROGRAMME. PROPOSE VISIT TO KRAKOW INSTEAD. OTHER POLISH PROPOSALS EMPHMSISE CEREMONY AND TOURISM. NO ROOM FOR NEGOTIATION ON GDANSK. RECOMMEND VISIT SHOULD GO AHEAD WITHOUT GDANSK PROVIDED SATISFACTORY ALTERNATIVE PROGRAMME CAN BE ACHIEVED.

DETAIL

2. CZYZICKI, HEAD OF MFA PROTOCOL DEPARTMENT, ASKED ME TO CALL TODAY 15 MARCH. HE CONVEYED POLISH RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSALS FOR THE PROGRAMME FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT.

3. MY FIRST IFT CONTAINS FULL DESCRIPTION OF POLISH PROPOSALS MAIN DIFFERENCES TO OUR PROPOSALS, AS PRESENTED BY CZYZYCKI, ARE:

(A) PROPOSAL TO VISIT GDANSK IS REJECTED, AND VISIT TO KRAKOW PROPOSED INSTEAD. CZYZYCKI EMPHASISED SEVERAL TIMES THAT THE POSITION OF THE POLISH AUTHORITIES ON GDANSK WAS UNEQUIVOCAL, MAKING CLEAR THAT THE DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL AND WAS NOT OPEN TO NEGOTIATION. IT WOULD SET A VERY IMPORTANT PRECEDENT AND WOULD DETRACT FROM THE NATURE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT. THE POLISH SIDE WAS THEREFORE INVOKING THE PREROGATIVE OF THE INVITING COUNTRY TO SAY THEY COULD NOT ACCEPT THIS PROPOSITION. KRAKOW WAS NOT ONLY A NORMAL BUT VERY IMPORTANT DESTINATION FOR VISITORS TO POLAND, AS POLAND'S FIRST AND HISTORIC CAPITAL. IT WOULD ENABLE THE PRIME MINISTER TO VISIT AUSCHWITZ. POLISH SOCIETY AS WELL AS INTERNATIONAL OPINION WOULD NOT UNDERSTAND IT IF THE PRIME MINISTER FAILED TO GO TO AUSCHWITZ.

(B) THE FIRST SUBSTANTIAL MEETING WITH THE POLISH AUTHORITIES SHOULD BE WITH PRIME MINISTER MESSNER, AS MESSNER WILL BE THE

PRIME MINISTER'S HOST:

(C) A VISIT TO THE ROYAL CASTLE IN WARSAW (POLISH SOCIETY 'WOULD NOT UNDERSTAND' IF THE PRIME MINISTER DID NOT GO) :

(D) A CALL ON THE MARSHALL (SPEAKER) OF THE SEJM (PARLIAMNT) MALINOWSKI:

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(E) A MEETING ORGANISED BY THE POLISH AUTHORITIES WITH MEMBERS OF THE CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL:

(F) IF THE PRIME MINISTER WERE TO LAY A WREATH AT THE MONUMENT TO THE GHETTO UPRISING IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT SHE SHOULD LAY A WREATH AT THE WARSAW NIKE MONUMENT, DEDICATED TO ALL THOSE WHO DIED IN WARSAW DURING THE WAR. VICE-PRESIDENT BUSH HAD DONE THIS:

(G) THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD ALSO UNVEIL A PLAQUE IN SKARYSZEWSKI PARK TO A BRITISH AIRCREW WHO DIED DURING THE AIRLIFT TO HELP THE WARSAW UPRISING: THIS WOULD EMPHASISE OUR COMMON PAST:

(H) THE VISIT TO HALA MIROWSKA HAS BEEN DROPPED.

3. IN RESPONSE I SAID THAT THE OMMISION OF GDANSK FROM THE PROGRAMME WOULD CAUSE GREAT DISAPPOINTMENT. THERE WERE A NUMBER OF OTHER ASPECTS (INCLUDING (B), (C), (D), (E), (F), (G), AND (H), ABOVE) WHICH WOULD CAUSE DIFFICULTY. THERE DID NOT SEEM ENOUGH OR APPROPRIATE TIME FOR THE PRIVATE PROGRAMME. I UNDERSTOOD THAT THE POLISH SIDE WISHED TO EMPHASISE THE CEREMONIAL ASPECTS OF THE VISIT AND TO SHOW THE PRIME MINISTER SOME OF THEIR HISTORY. HOWEVER, WE WERE STRIVING FOR A VISIT WHICH WOULD FOLLOW THE PATTERN SET BY THE PRIME MINISTER'S OTHER VISITS, FOR EXAMPLE, TO BUDAPEST AND MOST RECENTLY TO MOSCOW WHICH INVOLVED SUBSTANTIAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PARTY LEADER AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO MEET ORDINARY PEOPLE, AND OVERALL WHICH HAD A QUALITY OF INDIVIDUALITY AND NOT OF ROUTINE. YOU WOULD NEED TO CONSIDER CAREFULLY WHETHER THE POLISH PROPOSALS MET THOSE GOALS.

4. CZYZYCKI COMMENTED ONLY THAT WHILE THERE WAS NO ROOM FOR NEGOTIATION ON GDANSK, THE POLISH SIDE WERE READY AT LEAST TO TALK ABOUT SOME ASPECTS OF THEIR OWN PROPOSALS.

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COMMENT

5. THE POLISH COUNTER-PROPOSALS ARE HIGH ON CEREMONY. HISTORY AND TOURISM, AND RELATIVELY LOW ON SUBSTANCE. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT WE HAVE NO ROOM FOR NEGOTIATION ON THE GDANSK PROPOSAL. THE QUESTION IS THEREFORE WHETHER THE VISIT SHOULD GO AHEAD WITHOUT GANSK AND IF SO WHETHER A USEFUL PROGRAMME CAN BE PUT TOGETHER BASED ON THE POLISH PROPOSALS.

6. GDANSK WOULD HAVE GIVEN THE VISIT A UNIQUE QUALITY AND WOULD HAVE HAD PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE FOR SOLIDARITY. BUT WE KNOW, FOR EXAMPLE, FROM PROFESSOR GEREMEK, OF THE GREAT IMPORTANCE THAT WALESA AND THE SOLIDARITY LEADERSHIP ATTACH TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT AND HER WISH TO MEET THEM. THEY WOULD BE DEEPLY DISAPPOINTED, AND WOULD NOT UNDERSTAND IF IN THE EVENT THE PRIME MINISTER DID NOT COME BECAUSE SHE WAS DENIED THE POSSIBILITY OF A MEETING IN GDANSK, EVEN THOUGH A MEETING IN WARSAW WAS POSSIBLE. THERE WOULD IN ADDITION BE WIDESPREAD DISAPPOINTMENT AMONG ORDINARY POLES WHO HIGHLY ESTEEM THE PRIME MINISTER. THE PROSPECTS FOR OUR OWN ROLE HERE WOULD ALSO BE SERIOUSLY DAMAGED. I THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT, SEEN FROM HERE, THE ARGUMENTS FOR GOING AHEAD EVEN MINUS GDANSK ARE STRONG. BUT IF THIS RECOMENDATION IS ACCEPTED WE SHALL HAVE TO WORK HARD TO TURN THE POLISH PROPOSALS INTO AN ACCEPTABLE PROGRAMME. MY SECOND IFT CONTAINS PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS FROM HERE ON HOW THIS MIGHT BE DONE.

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OF 151750Z MARCH 88

MIPT: PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT: POLISH PROGRAMME PROPOSALS

1. FOLLOWING IS OUTLINE PROGRAMME PROPOSED TO ME BY POLISH
MFA ON 15 MARCH:

29 MAY PM: PRIME MINISTER ARRIVES BY AIR AT OKECIE MILITARY
AIRPORT. GREETED BY MESSNER, SENIOR OFFICIALS
AND GUARD OF HONOUR. DRIVE TO OFFICIAL POLISH
VIP VISITORS' RESIDENCE FOR BRIEF WELCOME TOAST
CEREMONY. PRIVATE SUPPER.

30 MAY AM: UNOFFICIAL PROGRAMME (EG CALL ON CARDINAL GLEMP).
1000 WREATH-LAYING AT TOMB OF UNKNOWN SOLDIER,
GHETTO MEMORIAL AND NIKE (HEROES OF WARSAW) .
1200 MEETING WITH MESSNER, FOLLOWED BY LUNCH
GIVEN BY MESSNER.

PM: VISIT ROYAL CASTLE AND WATCH SHORT FILM ON
DESTRUCTION AND REBUILDING OF WARSAW (1 HOUR).
CALL ON MALINOWSKI AT SEJM (50 MINS). MEETING AT
SEJM WITH MEMBERS OF THE CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL (40
MINS). LAY WREATH AT RAF MEMORIAL IN SKARYSZEWSKI
PARK. INTRODUCTORY CALL ON JARUZELSKI AT BELVEDERE
(30 MINS). TV INTERVIEW. DINNER GIVEN BY
JARUZELSKI.

31 MAY AM: ('EARLY, EG 0800') OFFICIAL TALKS WITH JARUZELSKI
(2 HOURS). VISIT BRITISH COUNCIL (30 MINS).
PRESS CONFERENCE AT INTERPRESS.

1200 PRIVATE LUNCH. 1300 FAREWELL TOAST CEREMONY.
1350 DEPART BY AIR FOR KRAKOW. 1450 MET BY KRAKOW
OFFICIALS.

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1500 DEPART FOR AUSCHWITZ. 1740 RETURN TO KRAKOW
FOR TOUR OF COLLEGIUM MAILLS AND MARIACKI CHURCH.
WALKABOUT IN MAIN SQUARE. DEPART KRAKOW FOR LONDON.

2. IN PRESENTING THIS PROGRAMME HEAD OF MFA PROTOCOL STRESSED THAT
IT WAS THE POLISH GOVERNMENT'S PRACTICE TO PROVIDE RESIDENCE
ACCOMADATION FOR THEIR MOST SENIOR GUESTS. TO DO MRS THATCHER
DUE HONOUR THEY WOULD LIKE HER TO STAY AT THE OFFICIAL RESIDENCE
RATHER THAN THE AMBASSADOR.

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PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO POLAND: REVISED OUTLINE PROGRAMME

29 May

pm Arrive. To Polish Government Guesthouse.
Briefing supper with HM Ambassador and senior Embassy staff.

30 May

am Wreath laying: Tomb of Unknown Warrior
Ghetto Memorial
Nike Memorial (heroes of Warsaw)

noon Call on Cardinal Glemp
Meeting with Prime Minister Messner

lunch Hosted by Messner

pm Visit Hala Mirowska market: visit old town square and Royal Castle (outside)

Introductory call on Jaruzelski (short)

Meeting with moderate independents

TV interview

dinner Hosted by Jaruzelski

31 May

am Talks with Jaruzelski

Visit St Stanislaw Kostka's Church, lay flowers on Father Popieluszko's grave

Open British Council Cinema and Exhibition Hall

noon Meeting and lunch at Residence with Walesa and other leading Solidarity figures.

pm Press Conference

Depart

PM TOURS: Poland: Feb 87

TBM

