

Note
See SH(85)2 for circulation

Ref. A085/3179

PRIME MINISTER

Subversion in Public Life

Earlier this year I discussed with a few Permanent Secretaries the changing nature of the subversive threat, both within the Civil Service and more generally, as evidenced by some disturbing examples of disruptive activities by the Militant Tendency in particular. As a consequence I decided to commission an up-to-date assessment of the threat. The work was undertaken by a small group of senior officials from Departments most affected, together with people from the Security Service and the Metropolitan Police Special Branch.

2. The group co-opted for their study several Principal Establishment Officers (PEOs) from some of the larger Departments most affected. This enabled them to follow through in some depth the information available from the Security Service, and to match it with management information from certain Departments. As a result, they have been able to construct a detailed picture of the location and activities of subversives in certain key Departments.

3. The group have thus produced a comprehensive and detailed account of the current threat from subversion and recommend a number of possible counter-measures which management in the Civil Service might take to combat it. I have considered their report with a number of Permanent Secretaries, and I am now minuting you with a summary of conclusions about the situation and proposals for action.

Extent and Nature of the Threat

4. The number of known subversives is thought to be of the same order as when the position was last reviewed in 1979 (using for this purpose the definition of subversion devised in 1972 and used by Ministers since then, most recently in the Parliamentary

proceedings on the Interception of Telecommunications Act last Session*). There are about 50,000 nationally, and 1,400 in the Civil Service. All but a small minority belong to left-wing organisations, and the largest scale single group continues to be the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB).

5. Within the national total, however, there has been a significant shift since 1979 to the largest Trotsykist groups, and in particular to the Militant Tendency (MT), which has increased from 1,500 members in 1979 to over 6,000 members now. MT is now the largest group after the CPGB and still growing fast. The relevant figures are set out in Appendix I.

6. The group found broadly the same pattern among the known subversives within the Civil Service, with the CPGB still the largest single group, although the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) has slightly more Civil Service members or sympathizers than has MT. Together, those two groups now have more members in the Civil Service than the CPGB has.

7. The great majority of subversives in the Civil Service are in the clerical or sub-clerical grades, with very few above the rank of Higher Executive Officer. It is noteworthy that the great majority are thus in the recruitment grades and that very few progress further. Only a very small number of subversives are active troublemakers (ie people who are unreasonably obstructive to management and determined to exploit or create industrial difficulties) - ten or less, even in the largest Departments. There is a similar number of known troublemakers in some Departments who are not known to be subversives.

* "Subversive activities are those which threaten the safety or wellbeing of the State and are intended to undermine or overthrow Parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means."

8. These few subversive troublemakers cause disruption, however, out of all proportion to their number. They concentrate their main efforts on gaining control of the national and regional executive committees of the two largest Civil Service unions, the CPSA and the SCPS. They have had mixed success in these efforts in recent years, winning and losing control at different times. This is particularly true of MT and SWP, whose members are judged by management to be much more disruptive than members of the CPGB and less ready to observe established industrial relations procedures and abide by agreements. MT in particular has shown itself able to increase its membership during disputes, especially among younger civil servants, and it is those Departments where MT is most influential which have experienced the most trouble.

9. This highlights a significant change in the nature of the subversive threat. The main threat in the past has been considered to be the possibility of classified information being transmitted to hostile or potentially hostile foreign powers, and our security and vetting procedures are directed mainly at countering that threat. This of course remains a real and serious problem. Recently, however, a threat of a different kind has assumed significant proportions: that is the threat of the disruption of public business through industrial action directed at areas of non-classified work which are particularly vulnerable or politically sensitive, often at considerable cost to the taxpayer. The vetting processes have been effective in virtually excluding subversives from access to classified information. The new threat to key areas is very different, and the traditional vetting processes are not really directed to dealing with it. It has to be countered by vigorous departmental management measures directed at the relatively small number concerned, rather than by central rules.

Counter-measures

10. The group have recommended a number of management initiatives:

- a. All Departments should now conduct the same sort of exercise as those represented on the group have done and

review regularly with the Security Service their lists of known subversives working in the Department. The objective of this is to ensure not only that the lists are kept up to date but also that senior management, and especially the PEO and the Permanent Secretary, are kept fully informed of the identity and location of known subversives in their Department, so that they can review regularly the current threat to their operations and the appropriate management responses to it.

b. All Departments should identify their key areas of work which are vulnerable to disruption.

c. All Departments should develop management procedures to ensure that, as far as possible, subversives are not posted to those key areas and that persistent troublemakers whether subversives or not, are identified and removed from there.

d. All Departments should take action to ensure that those who are granted facility time off work, whether subversives or not, are using it only for the purpose for which it has been granted and are not abusing it for political or other objectives.

11. These recommendations are fully in accord with the precepts of good management. We are faced with a new type of threat, which can only be contained by pinpointing the relatively few individuals concerned and their likely targets, and then using every means open to management to prevent the one from exploiting the other. This will require very sensitive handling, especially in getting the right message down to key managers. We obviously cannot circulate the conclusions of the latest assessment, or even refer to its existence or work, which we have taken great care to keep to a very restricted circle. Only a few Permanent Secretaries have been brought into this exercise so far. I would propose to

take an early opportunity to ask other Permanent Secretaries to undertake the same exercise with their security officers as those represented on the group have already done, and then to follow through with appropriate management action on the lines indicated. I shall stress that we are dealing with a relatively small number of known subversives and self-identified troublemakers in each Department, and also with a limited number of key areas. It should be possible for senior management in each Department to identify the particular measures which they can use to prevent or negate trouble and to ensure that facility time is not abused, if they assemble the necessary information and take an active role in tackling potential trouble. I would not think it right to widen the circle beyond that. It will be for each Permanent Secretary to inform his Minister as necessary about any particular problems arising in his Department and of the management action which will be necessary to counter them.

Further Studies

12. This exercise has been well worthwhile, and I have asked the group to make a similar assessment of the current threat from subversion in local government, education and the National Health Service. They will have to tackle this from the Security Service end alone, on the basis of the information available about known members of subversive organisations who work in each of these areas of public administration. It will not be possible to complement that information with a management view, such as the group were able to obtain from the PEOs of certain Departments, because of the political and public sensitivities of these areas which are not under direct central Government management. But the group consider that they can produce an assessment in the same confidential way that they have conducted the Civil Service inquiry, and I think this could be a useful contribution to our knowledge. We can consider what action to take when we have their further reports.

6 December 1985


ROBERT ARMSTRONG

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SH(85) 2

COPY NO

1

6 December 1985

CABINET

SUBVERSION (HOME) COMMITTEE

THE THREAT OF SUBVERSION IN THE CIVIL SERVICE

As agreed at the meeting on 27 November 1985, I am circulating herewith a copy of my minute of 6 December to the Prime Minister.

Signed ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Cabinet Office

6 December 1985

Ref. A085/3179

PRIME MINISTERSubversion in Public Life

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5. Within the national total, however, there has been a significant shift since 1979 to the largest Trotsykyist groups, and in particular to the Militant Tendency (MT), which has increased from 1,500 members in 1979 to over 6,000 members now. MT is now the largest group after the CPGB and still growing fast. The relevant figures are set out in Appendix I.

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6 December 1985


ROBERT ARMSTRONG

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SH(85) 1

COPY NO 1

21 October 1985

CABINET

SUBVERSION (HOME) COMMITTEE

—————
THE THREAT OF SUBVERSION IN THE CIVIL SERVICE
—————

The attached Report prepared by the Interdepartmental Group is circulated for consideration by the Committee at its forthcoming meeting.

Signed ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Cabinet Office

21 October 1985

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CABINET

INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP ON SUBVERSION
IN PUBLIC LIFE

Covering note by the Chairman

Attached is a report from the SPL Group (membership in Annex A) giving an up-to-date assessment of the threat of subversion nationally and with particular reference to the Civil Service. The report is now being submitted for consideration by SH.

The main points in the report are:-

(1) Definition of subversion

The definition used is that devised by SPL in 1972, quoted publicly by Ministers in 1975 and confirmed recently by Ministers during the Parliamentary proceedings on the Interception of Communications Act (paragraphs 4-7).

(2) Extent of the subversive threat

A detailed assessment of the threat nationally and in the Civil Service is at Annex B, and is summarised in paragraphs 9-11 of the report. The numbers are about 50,000 nationally (0.1 per cent of the adult population) and 1,420 in the Civil Service (less than 0.3 per cent), much the same as in 1979. All but a small minority belong to left-wing organisations, and the largest single group remains the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB); but the largest Trotskyist groups have increased in size, in particular the Militant Tendency (MT).

The numbers in Government Departments are set out in Appendix II to Annex B, and assessments by the PEO members of SPL of the position in their own Departments are at Annex C. These assessments cover the activities of known subversives, the amount of facility time granted, the areas most vulnerable to disruption and the measures taken by Departments to restrict the activities of known subversives and others who cause trouble. An account of subversive influence in the Civil Service Unions last year and this year is at Annex D.

On the basis of these analyses and assessments, SPL has concluded that the subversive threat is not much different in size from six years' ago and in the Civil Service continues to be heavily concentrated among the clerical and sub-clerical grades; but that a much larger part is now played by the younger and more active members of MT and the SWP, who are less ready than members of the CPGB to observe procedures and abide by agreements. There is still the traditional threat to classified information, but there has now grown up an additional and serious risk of disruption of public business through industrial action aimed at vulnerable or politically-sensitive areas of work, in particular the revenue-gathering and public payments centres such as those in DHSS, DE, Inland Revenue, Customs and Excise, and DVLC, Swansea. Trouble-making is by no means confined to known subversives, and only a few of them are active trouble-makers; but those few are adept at exploiting real or imagined grievancies among the lowest grades of younger civil servants, with seriously disruptive results in some cases. The exploitation seems to be more opportunistic than part of a planned strategy (paragraphs 12-15).

(3) Counter-measures

The report concentrates on the securing and dissemination of accurate information about subversives and on measures to curb their activities (and those of non-subversive trouble-makers). The main responsibility should be firmly with each Department, in consultation as necessary with the Security Service, as the Radcliffe Report said. Further measures recommended are:-

- (a) better arrangements between each Department and the Security Service to keep lists reviewed and up-to-date, as SPL has now done for the Departments represented by PEOs on it (paragraph 16);
 - (b) better arrangements within Departments to ensure that, in addition to the Security Officer, the PEO and Permanent Secretary know of the information available, and review it regularly and their assessment of the current threat and what management response is needed (paragraph 17);
 - (c) Departments should identify their key areas vulnerable to disruption and develop procedures to ensure as far as possible that subversives are not posted there and that persistent trouble-makers, whether subversives or not, are removed from there (paragraphs 18-22);
 - (d) Departments and the Treasury should take management action arising from their current review of facility time to curb abuses and reduce the scope for the achieving of political objectives in departmental time (paragraph 23).
- (4) Further work by SPL

This report comments briefly on the NHS and local government. SPL could undertake a further review of other areas such as the NHS or local government in, say, twelve months' time if that was thought worthwhile, although it could not examine other areas in such detail or so covertly as has been possible for the Civil Service in this report, with the help of the PEOs on the Group (paragraph 3).

M J A PARTRIDGE

Cabinet Office
21 August 1985

CABINET
INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP ON SUBVERSION
IN PUBLIC LIFE

THE THREAT OF SUBVERSION IN THE CIVIL SERVICE

Introduction

1. As the Inter-Departmental Group on Subversion in Public Life (SPL) we have been asked to produce an up-to-date assessment of the current threat to the Civil Service posed by members of subversive organisations, to assess the changes which have taken place in that threat since our last review in 1979 (contained in its final form in SH(79)3 (Revised)) and to provide a means for the appropriate dissemination of information on the threat. The composition of the Group and our terms of reference are set out in Annex A to this report, together with the names of the representatives of certain other departments whom it was thought appropriate to bring into our discussions for this particular task from the Ministry of Defence, the Department of the Environment and the Department of Health and Social Security. The contribution of the Principal Establishment Officers (PEOs) to our discussions has been invaluable in enabling us to set alongside the security assessment of the subversive threat a management analysis of the problems posed by known subversives to their employing departments and a practical appreciation of possible counter-measures that might be considered necessary.

2. We preface our assessment of the current threat by an account of the situation on the definition of subversion, because that lies at the heart of this matter and has been the subject of considerable public debate in recent months. Our assessment describes the scale and nature of the subversive threat nationally and in the Civil Service. As with our 1979 report, we have not covered the threat from espionage or from Irish terrorism, which are separate and special problems, but on this occasion, we have commented on the number of Scottish and Welsh nationalist extremists, which is extremely small. We have then gone on to analyse in some detail the distribution, size and nature of the subversive threat in major departments, and to discuss with the help of the PEOs on the Group our assessment of the activities of the known subversives within their departments and our views on possible counter measures.

3. We now present our conclusions on all these matters for consideration by the Subversion (Home) Committee (SH) and invite them to consider how work on a response should be taken forward and to direct further action by us, either on further periodic assessments of the threat or on whether we should examine in a similar way other areas of public life. Study of the subversive involvement in Local Government and the National Health Service has been suggested. The Security Service does not systematically investigate either area, but its impression from its study of the various subversive organisations themselves is that in both cases the threat is limited. Only MT has been systematically

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seeking to secure for its members seats as local councillors and, to date, it has achieved significant success only in Liverpool. Similarly, there is very limited subversive involvement in the Health Service unions at national level and, while there is some subversive involvement at District level in NUPE, the Security Service's impression is that the threat posed by subversives in the NHS at present is not large. A comprehensive examination of either area by the Security Service would take time and those of our members with administrative links with the NHS and local government would find it difficult to add significantly or systematically to any Security Service work. Nonetheless, a further review by the Security Service of the subversive threat to all areas of public life might be considered worthwhile in, say, twelve months' time.

The definition of subversion

4. In our 1979 report, we referred to the 1952 Directive to the Director General of the Security Service to defend the realm from actions of persons and organisations "which may be judged to be subversive to the State", and to the definition of "subversive" which was devised in 1972 and which has been generally accepted for this purpose:-

"Subversive activities are those which threaten the safety or well-being of the State and are intended to undermine or overthrow Parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means."

5. The definition was quoted by Home Office Ministers in both Houses of Parliament in 1975 and was confirmed by the Home Secretary in his evidence to the Select Committee of the House of Commons for Home Affairs during its recent investigation into the Special Branch and adopted by them in their report (House of Commons paper 71, May 1985). This definition was also used by the Home Secretary and the Lord President during debates on the Interception of Communications Bill currently before Parliament.

6. The Home Secretary has confirmed in Parliament that both parts of the definition have to be satisfied before an activity can properly be classed as subversive for this purpose, and that the definition does not cover activities which are hostile to a Government or its policies, but which are not intended to undermine or overthrow Parliamentary democracy. These limitations are important in ensuring that legitimate political or industrial opposition to the Government is not classed as subversive, and that counter-subversive investigations and actions do not become politically biased or influenced, and hence do not infringe the injunction in the Directive to the Director General that the Security Service should be kept "absolutely free from any political bias or influence and nothing should be done that might lend colour to any suggestion that it is concerned with the interests of any particular section of the community, or with any other matter than the Defence of the Realm as a whole".

7. The main criticism which has been levelled at this definition of subversion is that it is too wide and should be narrowed by being further restricted to activity which is unlawful. Such a restriction has been resisted by Ministers in Parliamentary debates on the Interception of Communications Bill on the grounds that it would allow too much scope to many subversive organisations, who take care to keep within the law and who profess their intention of achieving power by legal and constitutional means, but whose real aims are the destruction of the present system of Parliamentary democracy. Our review has given us no reason to recommend any change in the present definition.

The subversive threat

8. The Security Service provided us with a detailed assessment of the subversive threat nationally and with particular reference to the Civil Service, which we attach at Annex B as amended in the light of our discussions. This takes forward and updates the historical account of subversive groups contained in our 1979 report, and goes into more detail about the current threat in the Civil Service.

9. The current number of subversives is about 50,000 or a little over 0.1 per cent of the adult population, and it has not changed significantly in size since 1979. These people belong to more than 70 organisations, of which by far the most significant in size are the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), with about 13,000 members, and the three largest Trotskyist groups:

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Militant Tendency (MT), with over 6,000 members, the Workers Revolutionary Party (WRP) and the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), with about 4,000 members each. The CPGB is only about two-thirds of its size in 1979, the SWP has remained approximately the same size, but the MT has increased four-fold over that period. On the extreme right, the National Front (NF), with 2,500 members, and the British National Party (BNP) with 1,500 members, are the most significant organisations though not all members are judged to hold subversive views. The NF is far smaller than it was even five years ago.

10. The scope for most of these individuals to make trouble in pursuit of their subversive political objectives is limited, but it centres on their employment and the opportunities which that offers for disruption. Only the CPGB, MT, WRP and SWP pose a significant subversive threat on a national scale. The public service (the Civil Service, nationalised industries, NHS, education system and local government) and the Labour Party are the organisations most at risk from their activities.

11. We have concentrated in this report on the threat within the Civil Service. The total number of people with subversive records in the Civil Service known to the Security Service has increased since 1979, from 1,270 to 1,420. Of these, those associated with the CPGB remain the largest single group (at about 600) but, whereas they represented about two-thirds of the total

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number in 1979, they now represent less than half. The Trotskyist groups have been the fastest growing in the Civil Service over the last six years. The MT and SWP are particularly numerous, and in some Departments, such as DHSS, DE and the Inland Revenue their combined strength now exceeds that of the CPGB. By contrast, the number of civil servants known to belong to extreme right-wing groups, mainly the NF, is very small.

12. There are several important points to be made about these figures. First, they represent only those individuals known to the Security Service to be civil servants and to belong to, or be associated with, these groups, so that to this extent they may understate the true number of subversives. Our assessment, however, is that, with the possible exception of MT, which attempts to keep its membership secret, understatement on this account is relatively small. More importantly, the numbers include all those who are known to have been members or close associates of the organisations concerned at some time, and to this extent they will overstate the number of those currently active, who may be a significantly smaller proportion of the total.

13. Secondly, the total number in relation to the size of the Civil Service is less than 0.3 per cent, and by no means all those listed who are active in subversive organisations take an active part in Civil Service affairs. The political activities of some are confined to their outside political interests. We asked our PEO members for their assessment of those listed in their departments who were known to take an

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active part in Civil Service trade union activities, with particular reference to who were known troublemakers. In this context, by troublemakers we mean those who appear unreasonably obstructive to management and determined to exploit or create industrial difficulties. The various departmental assessments are summarised in Annex C. The number of active troublemakers on each list was 10 or less, even in the largest department. Moreover, by no means all the known troublemakers in departments were subversives.

14. On the basis of the departmental assessments we found no evidence of concerted efforts by subversive organisations to recruit civil servants or to organise their concentration in particular areas. The majority of those on the list were in clerical or sub-clerical grades, and very few were above the rank of Higher Executive Officer. (It is worth noting that, with the exception of HEO, these are all recruitment grades.) Their main activities, particularly those of MT, were directed at gaining control of the national and regional executive committees of the two largest Civil Service unions, the Civil and Public Services Association (CPSA) and the Society of Civil and Public Servants (SCPS), at which they have had mixed success in recent years, at some times winning control and at others losing it, as they have recently done with the CPSA NEC. The SCPS NEC has stayed the same so far as subversive members are concerned. In Annex D we set out the subversive membership for 1984/85 and 1985/86 of the main Civil Service trade union executives.

15. The vetting processes have been effective in virtually excluding members of subversive organisations from access to classified information. The risk now is of disruption of public business through industrial action directed at those areas of non-classified work which are particularly vulnerable or politically sensitive. Such areas include the major computer centres which handle social security contributions and payments to the public, which were the target of industrial action in the 1981 pay dispute and in the more recent Newcastle shift-working dispute, both of which were sustained for many months. Others are the revenue-gathering activities of the Inland Revenue and Customs and Excise, and the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Centre at Swansea. But CPGB, MT and SWP members are active and adept at exploiting real or imagined grievances among staff, particularly among clerical and sub-clerical grades, and at exploiting any disruption begun by others, though CPGB members in particular among the subversives traditionally observe established industrial relations procedures, and abide by agreements. One important consequence of such exploitation is an increase in the membership of the subversive groups during the disruption, especially among younger civil servants, which in turn increases the influence and resources of the groups. MT in particular has increased its membership during disputes in recent years, and it is those departments where MT is most influential which have experienced the most trouble. Non-subversive troublemakers have been equally in evidence, however, in recent years causing disruption.

Possible measures to counter the threat

16. We examined the arrangements under which the Security Service provides information about

individual civil servants with subversive records to security officers in departments, which are set out in the Manual of Personnel Security Measures. A summary appears in Annex E. We considered that these arrangements were working effectively, in that each department has, in its possession, a list of subversives employed there. As the report on security procedures in the public service (the Radcliffe Report, Cmnd 1931) made clear, each Government Department is individually responsible for maintaining a proper standard of protective security within its own field, advised as necessary on technical questions by the Security Service. We thought, however, that the arrangements for keeping the lists of subversives up-to-date could be improved and we concluded that departments should review their arrangements with the Security Service.

17. It was not clear what use departments made of these lists, apart from ensuring that people on them were not posted to sensitive posts such as Ministerial offices or to posts with access to classified information, and we concluded that there was room for improvement in the way in which departments used this information. It is particularly important that the information should not remain solely with the Security Officer, but should be made known regularly to the CEO and the Permanent Secretary, so that all departments could make the kind of periodic assessment of the threat within their department which we have made in our work for the departments represented on our group for this review; and so that they could also regularly assess what management response was needed from time to time to counter it. Proper security arrangements would need to be made, and care would need to be taken, to ensure that the information remained secure and that it was not used improperly by management. Nevertheless, we think that a more

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active use of the information is called for, both to focus on the extent and the nature of the actual threat from subversives, and to enable departments to keep subversives under observation to determine which are the troublemakers and take action to limit their capacity for causing disruption.

18. In view of the importance of vulnerable areas of work to the strategies of subversive groups, we have considered whether there might be scope for reducing the number of those areas. We recognise, however, that the division or duplication of work that would be required would, in most cases, be prohibitively expensive. We consider, however, that departments should identify formally, where they have not already done so, those Key Areas of work within their responsibility which are vulnerable to disruption although we recognise that, outside the core key areas of Private Office and mainframe computer operations, these may vary from time to time.

19. We have also considered whether the vetting arrangements should be extended or other checks should be introduced for staff transferred or recruited to work in Key Areas. Our conclusion is that this would not be practicable. An extension of vetting would be particularly contentious and costly. Positive Vetting (PV) and (unavowed) Normal Vetting (NV) have been developed as methods of protecting classified information. Their extension to unclassified work would not only go against assurances given by Ministers to Parliament over many years, but would be beyond the Security Service's present resources to support. It also seems to us very doubtful whether the substantial additional work involved would be worthwhile in terms of results. Nonetheless, departmental recruiters

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at any level need to be advised that they must beware of potential troublemakers when making their selections. Such advice could not be overt, but seems to us to be sound management sense, and should be explained as such.

20. The primary responsibility for counter-measures must lie with departmental management, in the light of the periodic assessments which we recommend they should make of their own subversive threat, to develop procedures in conjunction with the Security Service and to ensure that any relevant Security Service information is considered before postings are made to work in vulnerable areas. This is already done by some departments, on an ad hoc basis, and should, in our view, be extended to all. It would need to be a covert process, because any systematic barring of known subversives from certain work would be contentious. It must be left to the judgment of each PEO and Permanent Secretary, in consultation with the Security Service, to decide how widely to disseminate the information he has about subversives and how this should be communicated.

21. We recognised that such procedures could only address part of the problem. Many areas of Civil Service work are staffed by non-mobile grades who, once recruited, cannot be dismissed, without serious fault, or transferred elsewhere. This is especially the case with clerical grades, which is the level at which subversive organisations have been most successful in recruiting civil servants. Nevertheless, it seems to us important that persistent troublemakers, whether members of subversive organisations or not, should, wherever possible, be identified and distanced from such work, and there might be scope in some departments for achieving this, even for non-mobile grades.

22. For many departments, the numbers involved are so few that each case could be the subject of individual attention. Departments with larger

numbers of subversives listed might find it most effective to concentrate their efforts, at least in the first instance, on the known troublemakers who come to their notice, while continuing for the rest to ensure that they do not have access to sensitive posts or material. Each department will need to make its own assessment and adopt the most practical counter-measures suited to its purpose. It will probably find it necessary and desirable, however, to keep a particularly close eye on all activities of subversive troublemakers and ensure that wherever possible they come under the supervision of a good line manager.

23. One aspect to which we have paid particular attention is the number of known subversives involved in Civil Service trade union activities and the amount of facility time granted to them on that basis. For many departments, this overlap is small, and relatively few are on substantial facility time of 70 per cent or more. For some departments, however, the number is more worrying, and this gives a fresh impetus to the need for action to curb abuses of facility time which the Treasury and individual departments already have in hand, to ensure that known subversives are not allowed to use the position which they have secured to further their political objectives in departmental time. It is obviously desirable, for example, for departments to keep a close eye on the granting of substantial facility time to known subversives. It is even more important that line managers check as far as possible on the way in which facility time is used. We also concluded that good management measures of this kind would be as effective against troublemakers who are not subversives as against subversives.

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24. For most of the grades in which subversives are employed, no regard is paid to security information in the normal promotion procedures; but at the higher levels where problems of postability can arise, one or two departments do have covert systems to enable them if necessary to take these problems into account before promotions are decided. We consider that this action is right.

Recommendations

25. We recommend that SH should:

(a) take note of our assessment of the size and nature of the current threat of subversion in public life generally, and in the Civil Service in particular;

(b) agree that no study of other areas of public life is necessary at present, but should invite the SPL Group to reconsider the threat from subversion in public life in twelve months' time, or earlier if the Security Service advises that there has been a significant change in the threat;

(c) invite departments to review with the Security Service the arrangements necessary to ensure that their list of those subversives who are working in their department is always up-to-date;

(d) invite departments to review within their departments the arrangements for ensuring that senior officers (principally the PEO and the Permanent Secretary as necessary and in addition to the Departmental Security Officer) receive all information about the subversives working there and in the light of it decide on appropriate counter-measures;

(e) invite departments to identify formally, where they have not already done so, those Key Areas of work which are vulnerable to disruption;

(f) invite departments to develop procedures to ensure that, as far as possible:

(i) subversives are not posted to work in Key Areas; and

(ii) persistent troublemakers, whether members of subversive organisations or not, are identified and removed from work in Key Areas;

(g) invite departments to satisfy themselves that all those who have been granted facility time, whether they are subversives or not, are not abusing it.

CABINET

INTER-DEPARTMENTAL GROUP ON SUBVERSION IN PUBLIC LIFE

COMPOSITION AND TERMS OF REFERENCE

COMPOSITION

1. The Composition of the Committee is as follows:

Chairman

Mr M J A Partridge, Home Office

Members

Mr D H J Hilary, Home Office
Mr D B Smith, Department of Employment
Mr W O Ulrich, Department of Education and Science
Mr C J S Brearley, Cabinet Office
Mr W K Reid, Scottish Office
Mr C O Shipp, Security Service
Deputy Assistant Commissioner C V Hewett,
Metropolitan Police
Mr R M Hastie-Smith, Ministry of Defence
Mr K F J Ennals, Department of the Environment
Mr N E Clarke, Department of Health and Social
Security

TERMS OF REFERENCE

2. To give guidance on the collection, and to co-ordinate the assessment of, intelligence about threats to the internal security of Great Britain arising from subversive activities and to make periodic reports to the officials concerned.

SECRETARIAT

3. The Secretaries are:

Mr R A Harrington, Home Office
Mr S R Davie, Cabinet Office
Mr J F H Barker, Cabinet Office
Mrs S Rimington, Security Service

The Threat from Subversion: 1985Introduction

Subversion was defined in 1972* as

"activities which threaten the safety or well being of the state and are intended to undermine or overthrow parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means".

That definition was accepted by Ministers in the 1970-74 Conservative administration and in subsequent Labour administrations. It was quoted in both Houses of Parliament by Home Office Ministers in 1975 and defended in its entirety by the Home Secretary in February 1985 before the House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee. Pressure for change to the definition inside and outside Parliament is likely to continue.

Subversive Organizations and Individuals

2. The heart of the definition lies in its reference to the undermining or overthrowing of parliamentary democracy. Those persons judged to be subversive under the definition, are, in consequence, for the most part, those who subscribe to the main anti-democratic philosophies. These are Trotskyism, Fascism, Marxism-Leninism (previously known as Maoism), Anarchism and, despite the protestations of some Eurocommunists to the contrary, Communism. There are currently at least seventy organizations in Great Britain which adhere to those philosophies, varying in size from the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) with about 13,000 members, to a handful of exclusive Anarchist and

* SPL (72)1 of 11 October 1972

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Marxist-Leninist groups with only two or three members each. The total membership of all subversive organizations in Britain at present probably does not exceed 35,000 (see Appendix I). However, some of the larger organizations, such as the CPGB, have attracted persons, who, while never actually members, are sympathetic to their aims. Such sympathisers probably number about 15,000. In addition, other individuals, few in number, hold anti-democratic views, but are not members of, or sympathetic towards, any established subversive organization. The total number of subversive individuals in Britain, therefore, is probably currently about 50,000 or a little over .1% of the adult population.

The Current Threat

3. The scope for most of these individuals to pursue actively their subversive political objectives is limited, depending as it does largely on their employment and the opportunities it offers for disruption. To that extent, therefore, the threat posed by most subversives at any one time is potential rather than real. On the extreme right, some of the small Fascist organizations, and groups like the National Front and the British National Party, whose leaders, but not all of whose members, hold subversive views, present public order problems. They have little influence in industry and the public service, however, and do not, in consequence, present a subversive threat of any proportion outside the public order field. Members of some anarchist organizations, and of other groups, such as certain Black racial extremists in London, and Scottish and Welsh nationalist extremists, also present localized or limited public order problems largely resulting from their propensity for violence. On the extreme left, most groups are small and, as organizations, have little impact. At present, therefore, only the largest Communist and Trotskyist parties pose a significant threat on a national scale.

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The Communist Party of Great Britain

4. The CPGB is now a quarter of the size it was in 1940. It is also currently rent with internal policy differences. Three factions within the Party are discernable; first the pro-Soviet hardliners led by Fergus NICHOLSON and numbering approximately 400; second the "Industrials", who emphasize the importance of trade union work, look to the Soviet Union for Communist leadership, comprise about a third of the membership, and enjoy the support of the 'Morning Star' newspaper; and third, the Eurocommunists, whose views are, for the most part, accepted by the Party leadership, and who probably have the support of more than half the membership. The rivalry between these factions came to a head in May 1985 when the Party held its first Special National Congress since the one held in 1957 after the Soviet intervention in Hungary. The Congress reflected and consolidated the control of the Party apparatus by its Eurocommunist wing. Despite these divisions, the CPGB remains the largest subversive organization in Britain and the best established in many areas of public life. Moreover, while its leadership no longer slavishly follows the political line laid down by the Soviet Union, the Party still supports the main aims of Soviet foreign policy and many members continue to see themselves as part of an international movement led by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In consequence, Party members are in the forefront of support for the activities of International Communist Front Organizations such as the World Peace Council and the World Federation of Trade Unions, and, domestically, play a leading role in the British "peace" movement, where members of the Party's hard-line pro-Soviet factions, at least, have consistently advanced Soviet views on disarmament.

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5. Historically the CPGB's greatest influence has been in industry, particularly in heavy industry, and the Party continues to exercise a disproportionate influence within some trade unions. Three Party members sit on the 50 member Trade Union Congress General Council; Ken GILL of the Technical, Administrative and Supervisory Section (TASS) of the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (AUEW), Mick McGAHEY of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and Ray ALDERSON of the Civil and Public Services Association (CPSA). In addition another four members of the General Council have varying degrees of sympathy with the Party's aims. The Party does not currently control any trade union at national level, but dominates AUEW/TASS and has significant influence in other sections of the AUEW, in the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU), the Union of Construction Allied Trades and Technicians, the National and Local Government Officers Association (NALGO), the Society of Civil and Public Servants (SCPS) and in the NUM. It seeks to co-ordinate the activities of Communist trade unionists through a system of national and local industrial organizers, and of trade union or industry "advisory" committees. In practice these arrangements are only partially effective due largely to the indifferent calibre of the full-time Party officials involved. Nevertheless the Party or its members still have the ability on occasions to exploit, for political ends, real or imagined grievances among workers and to exacerbate any industrial unrest to which those give rise, and Communists have played a significant part in, for example, every coal strike since 1970, the 1982 rail strike, and in the industrial action at Grunwick and at the 'Messenger' print-works in Warrington. However, Communist agitation in industry is only effective when and where there are industrial issues which can be exploited. Moreover, the current retrenchment in those heavy industries within which the Party has been most successful in the past, has acted as a brake on militancy, and this has reduced the Party's ability to make trouble.

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6. In recent years the Eurocommunist dominated leadership of the CPGB has encouraged its members to involve themselves in what the Party manifesto 'The British Road to Socialism' (1977) describes as "broad democratic alliances". By this means the leadership has hoped both to increase the Party's influence within the Left in British politics and to shift the Left's policies further leftwards. The Party claims that this policy has had some success. Communists have joined such pressure groups as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), the Anti-Apartheid Movement, and the Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom (CPBF) in comparatively large numbers, and it is true that some of those bodies espouse causes which are also advocated by the Party. CND, for example, advocates policies on nuclear weapons virtually indistinguishable from those of the Party, and the CPBF's main objective, the acceptance by the media of a "right of reply", was first advanced by the Party, in 1977. However, the significance of these similarities of view should not be over-estimated. The policies of the Left in Britain have always tended to move leftwards during periods when the Labour Party is in opposition, and the CPGB no longer, as it once did with CND, dominates any major pressure group. In most, its members are now greatly outnumbered by campaigners with no subversive affiliations, who, while supporting individual policies also advanced by the Party, do not accept the Party's leadership or ideology.

7. Of all subversive groupings in Britain, the domestic Communists (ie the CPGB and the much smaller New Communist Party which broke from it in 1977), remain the best established in public sector employment. About 45% of the 1800 or more Civil Servants and employees of public corporations identified as having subversive records are Communists or Communist sympathisers, and Communists are the best represented among school teachers and lecturers in higher and further education. The threat posed by these people, however, is

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significant in the Civil Service only in certain circumstances; where the individuals are union officials, where there are concentrations of members and the work lends itself to disruptive activity, and where individuals have access to information which could be exploited for political purposes. Similarly, in education their influence is significant only in the few institutions where members are concentrated, in certain disciplines which have attracted Communist teachers, and at Universities where Communist academics hold leading positions or have attracted a student following. and Eric HOBBSAWM, formerly of Birkbeck College, for example, have both exerted considerable influence within their own academic disciplines and beyond.

Trotskyist Organizations

8. Britain is the only European country in which Trotskyism has attracted and retained a significant following, but the history of British Trotskyism has been characterized by a succession of divisions, ideological disputes and realignments. For many years it has concentrated round the policies and activities of three men; Gerry HEALY, Tony CLIFF and Ted GRANT, now leading members respectively of the Workers Revolutionary Party (WRP), the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and Militant Tendency (MT). Trotskyists adhere to TROTSKY's 'Transitional Programme' of 1938 which envisaged the establishment of a situation of "dual power" between workers' organizations on one side and the state administration on the other, in the expectation that the resulting conflict between the two would lead to revolution. While all British Trotskyists accept this theoretical basis for their activities, they differ over the means necessary to achieve the ends envisaged by TROTSKY. Two different approaches are discernable. Some groups like MT, and the groups formerly

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known as the Socialist League (SL) and the Workers Socialist League (WSL) practise entryism into the Labour Party, that is they seek to further their revolutionary aims by the clandestine penetration of the Labour Party with the aim of influencing, and eventually controlling, its policy. Other groups like the SWP, the WRP, the Revolutionary Communist Group and the Revolutionary Communist Party label entryism as "reformist", and seek in their different ways to undermine the authority of the State and its institutions directly rather than through an established non-subversive political party. Trotskyists have traditionally stressed the importance of international revolution. However no Trotskyist, as opposed to Communist, government has ever been established. British Trotskyist groups, in consequence, do not enjoy the political and occasional financial support that, for example, the CPGB has received from Eastern Europe.

Militant Tendency

9. The largest and most threatening Trotskyist group in Britain is now MT which, with a membership exceeding 6,300, is four times larger than it was at the time of the 1979 General Election. It has ambitious plans for future membership growth and for extending its activities. Its greatest strengths have been the dedication of its members and its strong internal discipline. These have given it an influence out of proportion to the comparatively small size of its membership. Most members are young; the average age of known and fully identified members and sympathisers in Liverpool and Glasgow (some 10% of the total), for example, is 30. Despite its recent growth, however, MT is rarely able to muster sufficient strength on its own within any organization to exert a dominating influence upon it. In consequence it operates by first establishing a well disciplined, if small, group of members within an organization.

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Those members then seek to attract the support of others by disguising their Trotskyist philosophy and instead advocating left-wing or radical policies which they anticipate will attract a wider following. Indeed MT's own political programme, published in the 'Militant' newspaper in 1981, was designed specifically, not to publicise its revolutionary objectives, but to attract recruits by arousing disillusionment with moderate Labour Party policies. It calls, inter alia, for the nationalization of the top 200 companies and the abolition of the monarchy and House of Lords. Once established with a following in an organization, MT is often able, through the assiduous attendance of members and sympathisers at meetings and on committees, to exert considerable influence.

10. MT's activities reflect its aim of infiltrating and eventually controlling the Labour Party. In pursuit of that aim, its principal targets are Constituency Labour Parties, the Labour Party Young Socialists (LPYS), local councils, trade unions and the National Organization of Labour Students (NOLS). In all those areas it has achieved notable successes in recent years. MT now has two MPs* and significant influence in approximately 20 Constituency Labour Parties. At the 1984 Labour Party Conference, ten resolutions were actually proposed by MT members on topics ranging from local government and control of the police to the economy and defence. Five of those resolutions were carried against the wishes of the Party's National Executive Committee (NEC). MT claimed, probably accurately, that 30 of its members spoke during the debates out of an overall total of 80 from Constituency Parties. These successes were achieved despite the fact that during 1984 MT gave trade union activity priority over Constituency Party work. They reflected MT's strength in the Labour Party at local level, a strength derived from the membership of all MT members of the Labour Party itself.

* Terry FIELDS (Liverpool Broadgreen) and Dave NELLIST (Coventry South East)

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11. MT has been engaged during the last eighteen months in a major recruitment drive which has included trade unionists, and has been particularly successful in the white collar unions such as the CPSA and the Post Office Engineering Union (POEU). The Tendency employs in its London Headquarters at least eight full-time industrial organizers and others in the provinces, and has set up "caucuses" (clandestine groups which meet to co-ordinate MT activity) in nearly thirty unions. Numerically too thin on the ground to win great influence within unions unaided, MT generally operates by seeking to establish or take over "Broad Lefts" (loose coalitions of union members with a wide range of left-wing views) in unions. The CPSA and POEU national executive committees were both under the control of "Broad Lefts" set up by MT although the CPSA "Broad Left" has since split in two. In addition MT currently enjoys varying degrees of influence at national level in the TGWU, the Society of Graphical and Allied Trades '82, the National Union of Seamen, the Confederation of Health Services Employees and the Fire Brigades Union. Members of NALGO and the National Union of Public Employees are also currently a target for MT.

12. MT members were involved in industrial action during 1984 at DHSS in Newcastle, at British Leyland, in the national docks strike and in the miners' strike. MT as an organization, however, does not foster industrial militancy as an end in itself; rather it sees it as a way of gaining recruits among union members and of raising the political consciousness of the workers with the aim of eventually shifting the policies of the trade unions, and through them the Labour Party, leftwards. MT, therefore, judged their involvement in the DHSS and miners' strikes as particularly beneficial, and in October 1984 claimed to have recruited up to 600 miners. Similarly, despite the eventual collapse of the DHSS strike, MT believes that it is held in high esteem by

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CPSA members in Newcastle and that it is likely to make more recruits to add to the eighteen made during the strike. MT now claims to have 400 members in the CPSA, and while there is no evidence that it has singled out Civil Servants as a particular target, it is clear that it is making a number of recruits within the Civil Service, particularly at clerical officer level. The number of known MT members in the Civil Service increased in 1984 by about 70 to at least 300. On the information currently available Departments most affected are DHSS, the Department of Employment and the Inland Revenue.

13. MT has had successes in other areas. The LPYS, the official youth wing of the Labour Party, is controlled by MT at national level and has been since 1970. This gives it a seat, as of right, on the Labour Party's NEC. MT has also made intermittent progress within NOLS, the student body for Labour Party members and supporters, although its current influence on the NOLS executive is slight. In local government it has been conspicuously successful in Liverpool City Council. This success has resulted from hard work. MT members and sympathisers only represent a minority within the ruling Labour majority on the Council but they have rehearsed their voting tactics carefully in advance and adhered closely to them at meetings. Members have also attended virtually all meetings of the Council and Sub-Committees diligently, gained chairmanships of key Sub-Committees, and tried hard and, with some success, to attract support from other Labour Party Councillors. These tactics have given MT an influence on the Council far greater than its mere voting strength. Attempts by MT to exploit local government issues elsewhere, by encouraging members to stand for election as councillors, are still at an early stage.

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14. MT has, however, had its problems, and these have reduced its subversive impact. The five members of the editorial board of 'Militant' were expelled from the Labour Party in 1983 amid considerable press speculation about MT's activities, and the Labour Party leadership is well aware of MT's true Trotskyist character. Press interest continues to have an adverse affect on the organization. MT hopes that in the selection and reselection process of Labour Party Parliamentary candidates for the next general election they will succeed in obtaining more candidacies. The organization has, however, been upset by the publicity which has been focused on their intentions and believe that this has damaged their chances particularly in Central Scotland. Internally the very rapid expansion of membership in the last eighteen months has not been problem free. It has forced MT to relax its very strict requirements for the training and "integration" of recruits. As a result the commitment and ideological understanding of some new members is lacking and the leadership has come to accept that quite a high proportion of new recruits may leave within a few months. Moreover, MT started 1985 in some financial difficulty and found it necessary for a time to postpone the appointment of further full-time staff.

Other Trotskyist Groups

15. Other Trotskyist groups which practise entryism into the Labour Party, such as SL and WSL have not been as successful as MT. Indeed SL is now divided over the effectiveness of that tactic, and despite some limited success in the LPYS and in a few Constituency Parties, may well break up over it. In fact the impact of most of the smaller Trotskyist groups is limited, and, besides MT, only the SWP and WRP present a significant subversive threat. Those two groups have both suffered a decline in membership from peaks in the

mid 1970's, however, and to that extent are less of a threat than they were. In addition, the SWP has had an ambivalent attitude towards the involvement of its members in trade union activity at senior level. During 1983 and 1984 SWP members were forbidden by the Party to take national office in trade unions. However, members were still often involved in picketing, in the sale of their newspaper 'Socialist Worker' at industrial disputes and sometimes in violent work-place confrontations with the police. Moreover, that Party, like MT, claimed to have made successful recruitments among miners during the miners' strike, and during 1983 alone its members were actively, and sometimes violently, involved in industrial troubles at Tilbury Docks, in the October 1983 social workers dispute and, in large numbers, in the 'Messenger' newspaper picketing. Such SWP activity will continue and may increase after the recent SWP decision to resume work within trade unions at national level.

16. In the late 1960s and the early 1970s, the SWP (then known as the International Socialists) attracted large numbers of higher education students to its ranks. That educational background of some of the membership is still reflected in the comparatively large number of SWP members who are employed in the Civil Service and as teachers. After the CPGB, the SWP has, with at least 380 the largest number of known members and sympathisers employed in the Civil Service of any subversive organization. Its members are apparently most numerous in the DHSS. However, they are only likely to have an impact if they are union officials or where a number work together. At educational institutions, however, SWP members, although not as numerous as Communists, are often more conspicuously active among the students, largely because the Party encourages their involvement in public demonstrations. During the spring of 1982 alone, the Party led twenty-one occupations of College buildings

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in protest over alleged education cuts and more recently its members have been involved in the unrest at the Polytechnic of North London and in the numerous protests over cuts in student grants. Such activity is seen by the Party as a good way of attracting recruits, and as a means of undermining what it considers to be "bourgeois" educational institutions. The SWP supports a full-time student organizer from Party funds and an SWP national student committee assists with the co-ordination of Party activity at more than 50 institutions. As a means of extending the Party's influence and attracting new student recruits, Party members organize Socialist Worker Student Societies (SWSS) at colleges and polytechnics. Many SWSS members eventually join the SWP. However, the Party is not the force it once was in the education field. Its student membership was down from about 800 in 1976 to about 450 in 1984, and its school teacher membership from approximately 300 in 1978 to about 200 in 1984. Nearly 100 of those school teacher members, however, work in London where they have been involved in industrial action over the teachers current pay claim.

17. The WRP continues to receive financial assistance from the Palestine Liberation Organization and to benefit from the earnings of Vanessa and Corin REDGRAVE both of whom are WRP Central Committee members. As a result, it is comparatively wealthy, and is able to produce a professional daily newspaper, 'News Line', and to spend lavishly on attempts to recruit young people to its youth section, the Young Socialists (YS). It has, in recent years, concentrated on the establishment of Youth Centres in areas of high unemployment. Those Centres, administered by YS members, ostensibly provide vocational training and recreation for unemployed youth, but are, in fact, effectively venues for Party activity and recruitment among a potentially disaffected section of the

population. Centres have so far been opened in Brixton, Glasgow, Liverpool, Merthyr Tydfil, Nottingham, Newcastle and Manchester. In industry, the WRP is less successful and less conspicuously active than either MT or the SWP, but its front organization, the All Trades Unions Alliance has attracted some trade unionists to WRP policies.

1985: The Vulnerable Areas

18. One area particularly vulnerable to subversive activity is the Civil Service. At the end of 1984 approximately 1400 Civil Servants were identified as having subversive records; the majority were Communists and Trotskyists. 1144 of these were employed in eight Departments (see Appendix II). However, those statistics probably understate the real figures. MT, in particular, is a clandestine organization and details of all its members are not known. The MT members in the CPSA and the Communists in the SCPS in particular will be hoping to exploit Civil Service pay negotiations, and changes in work practices resulting from the introduction of new technology, to recruit new members and disrupt the machinery of government. Vetting and other security procedures have virtually excluded subversives from the Armed Services and the Police and have protected classified information within Departments. The Navy and the RAF vet most of their employees, but the Army vets only those who have access and commissioned officers. Nevertheless the number of soldiers with subversive records is negligible. One effect of vetting procedures, however, has been to concentrate those with subversive records in Departments, whose information is not, in the main, classified.

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19. Other organizations are also at risk. The nationalized industries are a perennial target for subversive attack, particularly from the CPGB via their unions. Dissatisfaction among Health Service employees will continue to offer opportunities for subversive groups, particularly MT. Following the rate capping legislation and MT's success in Liverpool, local government is likely to be a target for subversive groups who will be hoping to secure seats as councillors, and recruits among local authority workers, and to use local grievances to attack government policies. After a period of comparative stability, the education system offers to subversives the opportunity for disruptive action, primarily to Communists and, in London, to SWP teachers, who will continue to try to exploit discontent over salaries. Trotskyist students are also likely to be in the forefront of unrest over grants and the control of student union funds. Finally, the Labour Party is at risk from MT and the small entryist groups, who will continue to seek to exploit the selection and reselection process for Parliamentary candidates, and local government grievances, to increase their influence within that Party.

20. The importance of subversive organizations and the risk they pose, however, should not be over-estimated. Subversive groups are small and are only really effective when they can exploit events, policies or grievances to attract the support of others for their activities. Even then, and this applies particularly to MT's machinations within the Labour Party, such support is volatile and can easily be lost, if, for example, their real intentions are exposed. In some areas, notably within industry and on employment issues, subversive organizations find it comparatively easy to find opportunities that can be exploited. In other areas they find it more difficult. A number of Trotskyist groups, for example, have attempted to use the unrest

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in Northern Ireland as a vehicle for attacking successive governments, but support for Irish Republican extremism on the mainland has remained negligible. Nevertheless, subversive organizations remain constantly on the look-out for new opportunities to exploit and for chances to misrepresent government policies for their own political ends.

Summary

21. In sum, there are probably about 50,000 subversives in Britain divided between some seventy organizations. The ability of most of those individuals to make trouble in pursuit of subversive political objectives is limited, but the CPGB and the three largest Trotskyist groups, MT, the SWP and the WRP do currently pose a significant subversive threat on a national scale. The Civil Service, nationalized industries, National Health Service, education system, and local government as well as the Labour Party are the organizations most at risk from their activities.

SECRETSubversive Organizations in Great Britain - December 1984

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Approximate Membership</u>
<u>Domestic Communist Parties</u>	
Communist Party of Great Britain	13,000
Young Communist League	400
New Communist Party	450
Others	60
	<hr/>
Total	13,910
 <u>Foreign Communist Parties</u>	
(with significant Great Britain membership)	
AKEL (Cypriot Communist Party)	730
Italian Communist Party	600
Iraqi Communist Party	350
Turkish Communist Party - Leninist	250
Others	360
	<hr/>
Total	2,290
 <u>Trotskyist Groups</u>	
Militant Tendency	6,300
Workers Revolutionary Party	4,000
Socialist Workers Party	4,000
Socialist League	700
Revolutionary Communist Group	230
Red Action	200
Revolutionary Communist Party	190
Others	550
	<hr/>
Total	16,170

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Organization

Approximate
Membership

Right Wing Extremist Organizations

National Front*	2,500*
British National Party*	1,500*
Fascist Groups	420

Total (subversives only) c500

Marxist-Leninist (formerly Maoist) Groups

Communist Party of Britain (Marxist-Leninist)	450
Revolutionary Communist Party of Britain (Marxist-Leninist)	120
Revolutionary Communist League of Britain	100
Others	130

Total 800

Anarchist Organizations

Anarchist Federations	300
Big Flame	150
Direct Action Movement	100
Others	300

Total 850

Other Subversive Organizations

Scottish and Welsh Nationalist Extremists	50
Black and Asian Racial Extremists	150
Others	50

Total 250

Overall Total of Subversives

= approximately 35,000

* These organizations attract individuals of a wide range of opinions; not all hold subversive views.

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Appendix II

Government Departments - holders of subversive records on 31 December 1984

The total number of identified holders of subversive records for whom Government Departments had security responsibility was 1420 on 31 December 1984. 733 had Trotskyist records, 607 Communist records and anarchist, nationalist and Fascist records totalled 80. The table below sets out in detail the figures for the 8 Departments with more than 50 such people and gives combined figures for the rest. The table covers individuals with records ranging in significance from 1984 membership of a subversive organisation to old sympathies. (It does not, however, include anyone whose subversive record has been re-assessed and found to be no longer significant.) In line with vetting requirements the figures also include close relatives of members or sympathizers who are not themselves members of a subversive group.

<u>Department</u>	<u>Subversive Total</u>	<u>CPGB/ NCP</u>	<u>SWP</u>	<u>MT</u>	<u>Other Trotskyists</u>	<u>Anarchists/ Nationalists</u>	<u>Fascists</u>
Health and Social Security	360	116	114	86	31	7	6
Employment Group	239	96	58	46	30	6	3
Inland Revenue	169	53	44	50	11	5	6
Defence	111	66	16	13	11	-	5
Environment/Transport	108	56	17	14	13	4	4
Trade and Industry	53	29	4	12	5	1	2
Home Office (including the Prison Service)	52	29	2	5	4	1	11
Customs and Excise	52	24	4	13	4	4	3
	1144	469	259	239	109	28	40
Other Departments	276	138	58	45	23	7	5
	1420	607	317	284	132	35	45

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DEPARTMENTAL ASSESSMENTS OF THE ACTIVITIES OF SUBVERSIVES:
MARCH 1985Introduction

In examining their records, Departments found that there were a few discrepancies between their records of the subversives employed and those of the Security Service. The main reasons for this were that the Security Service had not received regular notification of retirements, resignations and transfers from Departments and had not itself always informed Departments of the name of the Trotskyist group to which an employee belonged.

Scottish Office

2. The Departments of the Secretary of State for Scotland employ just over 12,000 staff. In those Departments, 25 persons have come to notice as subversives, seven of whom are Communists, seven SWP members and seven MT members or sympathisers. Three of the 25 are of HEO grade, the remainder being more junior; five are prominent trade union activists, and two of those (in the Department of Registers of Scotland) are CPSA office holders. The Departments' experience is that the targets most vulnerable to disruption are payments made by mainframe computer to such groups as farmers, retired teachers, recipients of student grants and suppliers generally, and the work of the Sheriff Courts and the conveyancing and house sales facilitated by the Department of Registers. In the Scottish Office as a whole, there are about 150 accredited representatives of the Unions, who log about 10 per cent facility time on average. Only 9 people receive 100 per cent facility time.

Department of Education and Science

3. There are some 2,400 staff in DES of whom 15 have come to notice as subversives. The DES also has security responsibility for the Research Councils whose staff are neither Civil Servants nor employed by the Crown, and who total around 12,000 of whom 27 have come to notice as subversives. As regards the DES staff, the majority of subversives employed belong to the CPGB. Most work in London, but two are employed at the computer centre in Darlington. Only one is an active member of the trade union side and he has no facility time. The Department's policy is to keep known subversives away from posts in Ministerial Private Offices and from sections supporting them or the most senior officials, and from Establishments, Finance and Science Branches. The Department has experienced no significant problem caused by the subversives, and has few areas of work vulnerable to disruption.

Department of Employment

4. The Group (ie the Department itself, the Manpower Services Commission, the Health and Safety Executive and ACAS) employs about 54,500 staff, the great majority in regional and local offices. Of the subversive total of around 240, Trotskyists account for over 130 and the Communists for just under 100. Many have been employed for some time and most have not, by their behaviour, known activities or in other ways attracted the adverse attention of management. Although nearly half of the total number of subversives are active in trade union affairs and 71 receive facility time, most - particularly CPGB members - act responsibly whereas there are other activists without any subversive record who are both troublesome and irresponsible. In recent years subversives have not been responsible for disruptive industrial action and there are currently no offices in the Group which appear vulnerable to such action. Management ensures that known subversives are not posted to sensitive HQ areas or to specially vulnerable work.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

Department of Health and Social Security

5. The DHSS has over 93,000 staff, most of whom are employed in social security offices locally or at headquarters in Newcastle and North Fylde. The Department is the largest employer of subversives in the Civil Service, with in excess of 350. About a third are Communists and two-thirds Trotskyists. Most are CPSA members, and 74 are trade union activists receiving significant facility time. The DHSS areas most vulnerable to disruption are the computer centres at Newcastle, Washington, North Fylde, Reading and Livingstone, where industrial action by computer staff has an immediate effect on the payment of benefit to the public and/or related work. Emergency measures had been devised and used successfully to maintain a reduced service during industrial action in 1984, but those were expensive. The local office network generally is not considered to be especially vulnerable, short of a national Civil Service strike, because only a small proportion of the offices would be affected at any one time. However, a disproportionately large number of members of subversive organisations work in local offices in Inner London, which may be more at risk than those in the provinces. The Department takes care to keep subversives away from Ministerial Offices and classified information. In the development of the computer projects within the Social Security Operational Strategy - referred to in the recent Green Paper as the Computerisation of Social Security Administration - careful consideration is being given to their vulnerability to various contingencies, including industrial action and fall-back arrangements are so far as possible being included in the design of the projects.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

Ministry of Defence

6. The MOD has 174,000 staff, of whom 79 have a subversive record (more than 30 having left the Department since their name had been notified by the Security Service). The majority (54) were CPGB members, with much smaller numbers in the various Trotskyist groups. The individuals concerned are scattered across a large number of MOD UK establishments, and the only significant feature is a large concentration in the Rosyth area, where 13 CPGB and 2 MT members are employed. About 20 subversives are trade union activists who receive facility time, about 12 of whom are involved in extra-mural political activity, ranging from standing as a prospective Parliamentary candidate to taking part in demonstrations. The Department has been unable to find any evidence for a pattern of activity among this scattered group and on the evidence available concludes that there do not appear to be any MOD areas of work which are currently particularly vulnerable to disruption.

Department of the Environment/Department of Transport

7. The DOE (which includes PSA) and the DTp have about 48,000 staff of whom about 100 are known subversives. A slim majority are Communists with most of the remainder being members or sympathisers of various Trotskyist groups. Eighteen are trade union activists, of whom eleven are trade union side office holders and three received 100% facility time. Not all the Departments' troublemakers are people with subversive records. The Departments have not experienced any significant industrial action since 1981. The most vulnerable unit within the Departments' responsibility was the DVLC computer centre at Swansea, which was the subject of serious disruption in 1981. There is another major computing centre at Hastings (which is more quiescent) and a number of highly sensitive military and civil establishments which the PSA maintains, but in respect of which the risk of militant action remains low.

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Annex D

Subversive influence in the Civil Service Unions

A. Civil and Public Services Association

The subversive membership of the 1984-85 National Executive Committee (NEC) was 16 out of 29, there being 5 members of MT, 9 Trotskyist sympathisers and 2 members of the CPGB. The subversive membership of the 1985-86 NEC is 2 out of 29, there being 1 member of the CPGB and 1 Trotskyist sympathiser.

B. Society of Civil and Public Servants

The subversive membership of the Executive Council has remained 11 out of 26, 1984-86. There are 8 CPGB members, 1 former member of the New Communist Party assessed as a pro-Soviet Communist, 1 member of the Communist Party of Britain (Marxist-Leninist) and 1 Trotskyist sympathiser.

C. Institution of Professional Civil Servants

There were no known subversives on the 1984-85 National Executive Committee nor are there any currently.

D. Civil Service Union

None of the members of the National Executive Committee 1983-85 has a subversive record.

E. Inland Revenue Staff Federation

The Executive Committee 1984-85 and 1985-86 includes 1 member of MT out of a total of 29.

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Arrangements for providing Departments with Security Service Information

Departments obtain information held by the Security Service in three ways:

- a. from the normal vetting process;
- b. from the positive vetting process; and
- c. through the 'after care' arrangements.

Normal Vetting

2. In general, normal vetting is applied to all persons who are being considered for employment which affords access to information classified CONFIDENTIAL or above. Departments submit details of the candidate being vetted and the Security Service then either -

- a. advise that there is "no security objection" (NSO); or
- b. provide the Department with a summary of the security information and give an assessment of the degree of risk which would attach to the employment of the individual in a post affording access.

Positive Vetting

3. In general, positive vetting is applied to all persons who are being considered for employment which affords constant and regular access to TOP SECRET information. During the positive vetting process Departments submit details (additional to those required in normal vetting) and the Security Service makes checks and provides any information or advice that may be necessary.

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After Care

4. A Security Service reply 'NSO' to a vetting enquiry is necessarily valid only for the moment when it issues. It is not a certificate of reliability. It is, therefore, important that any new information which might affect the reliability of someone occupying a sensitive post is brought promptly to the attention of the responsible authorities. This is met by procedures known collectively as 'after care'. They include a service of information provided by the Security Service.

5. If the Security Service receive significant adverse information about a civil servant, they provide the Department concerned with a summary, whether or not he has currently access to classified information. Similar action is taken in respect of those employed by certain other public bodies for which there is a vetting commitment, and for members of the Armed Forces.

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